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UNFRAMING LEGAL REASONING: A
CYCLICAL THEORY OF LEGAL
EVOLUTION
LARRY A. DIMATTEO*
Ode to Maine and Isaacs
This is a story of two men from Cambridge
One in the old world, the other in the new;
One's story flows like a river
the other caught in a whirlpool;
One was a father who did not know his prodigal son
The son, on the other hand, knew of his erring father;
In the end, their protagonism was made more of straw
than of concrete;
Nonetheless, legal scholarship is the beneficiary
of their unknowing intellectual tussle.'
I. INTRODUCTION
This article draws from legal history to inform a part of legal theory. The
legal history examination focuses on two theories of legal development-
*. Huber Hurst Professor of Contract Law, University of Florida, J.D. Cornell University, LL.M.
Harvard University, PhD Monash University (Australia). The author would like to thank the participants
of the Obligations VIII Conference hosted by Cambridge University in September 2016, and Samuel
Flaks for his insightful comments to an earlier draft of this article.
I. The author wrote this "ode." Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1822-1888) graduated from Pembroke
College, Cambridge University in 1944 and went on to become the Whewell Professor of International
Law. His most famous work, Ancient Law, was published in 1864. Nathan Isaacs (1886-1941) earned his
law degree and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Cincinnati, before obtaining his doctorate in
the law at Harvard under the tutelage of Dean Roscoe Pound. He was denied a teaching position at
Harvard Law School, likely due to anti-Semitism within the University. He ended up being one of the
first, openly Jewish professors at Harvard University with his appointment as a Professor of Business
Law at the Harvard Business School in 1924 where he remained for the rest of his life. He was a legal
realist who wrote seminal articles in such diverse areas as arbitration, contracts, constitutional, securities
regulation, torts, and trust law. For a discussion of the life of Nathan lsaacs, see Samuel Flaks, Law,
Religion, and Pluralism: The Thoughts and Experiences of Nathan Isaacs, 39 TOURO L. REV. 307 (2013)
[hereinafter Flaks, Law, Religion, and Pluralism].
484 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 27:483
Henry Sumner Maine's "progression thesis"' 2 and Nathan Isaacs's "cycle
theory."3 After examining these two theories of legal development, the
analysis shifts to how legal history informs theories of legal reasoning. There
are numerous long-standing debates on how "law" should be interpreted.
These debates are replicated in the question of how "contracts" should be
interpreted. Contract law and contract interpretation will be the focus in
examining how history informs legal theory, and more specifically, legal
reasoning.
In the end, as is the case with all contract theories, no monist view of
legal development possesses the explanatory power needed to understand
how law has come to be and where it may take us in the future. However,
whether progressive, cyclical, or progressive-cyclical in nature,4 theories of
legal development lend insight to current debates on legal reasoning. At the
same time, views of legal development challenge the notion of eras of legal
reasoning' as distinctive demarcations between formalism and realism;
literalism and contextualism; and the appropriateness of rules versus
standards, as well as contract law's role as facilitator versus regulator.
In the end, this Article concludes that history shows how styles of legal
reasoning evolve along a pattern of constant recurrence. Legal history and
the cycle theory of legal development suggest that all forms of legal
reasoning are present in all eras of legal thought. It will be argued that cycle
theory falsifies the great debates and dichotomies in legal scholarship, such
as formalism versus contextualism, the importance of the public-private law
distinction, and to a lesser extent the proper role of rules versus standards in
law's conceptual structure.6 On the latter point, cycle theory also provides
insight on how rules and standards evolve and interact with each other.
2. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (Beacon ed. 1963) (1864) [hereinafter MAINE, ANCIENT
LAW]. Maine's famous aphorism states:
The word Status may be usefully employed to construct a formula expressing the law of
progress .... All the forms of Status taken notice of in the Law of Persons were derived from,
and to some extent are still coloured by, the powers and privileges anciently residing in the
Family. If then we employ Status... to signify these personal conditions only.., we may say
that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to
Contract.
Id. at 164-65 (emphasis original).
3. lsaacs's critique of Maine is as follows: "Maine's three agencies [legal fictions, equity, and
legislation] their proper positions as mere arcs in a cycle, a constantly recurring cycle-of which Maine
says nothing." Nathan lsaacs, 'The Law' and the Law of Change: A Tentative Study of Comparative
Jurisprudence, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 748 (1917) [herinafter Isaacs, Law of Change].
4. See infra Part V.E.
5. For example, American legal thought has commonly been divided into a number of eras. See
GRANT GILMORE, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977) [hereinafter GILMORE, AGES] (discussing eras of
American law); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978) (three stages of
American contract law); MORTON J. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960
(1992) (same).
6. See Larry A. DiMatteo, False Dichotomies in Commercial Contract Interpretation, I 1 J. INT'L
TRADE L. & POL'Y 27 (2012).
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The idea that law evolves progressively recognizes that there are
relatively stable dichotomies whose opposing poles fluctuate over time.
Moreover, even when a given end of the poles becomes dominant in a given
era of legal development, its dominance is never absolute. Every era
possesses both sides of the above noted dichotomies. In the case of contract
law, the status-contract dichotomy possesses descriptive power in explaining
different eras of contracts.' The dichotomy is a powerful tool to analyze the
surface of contract law-its principles, standards, and rules. However, the
scholar needs to dig below the surface to better understand the underlying
tensions.
The intellectual starting point for this undertaking is Nathan Isaacs's
cycle theory of legal development.8 His view of legal development takes
issue with Henry Sumner Maine's thesis (Maine's Thesis) that development
in advanced legal systems is progressive in nature. With a long historical
lens, Isaacs sees the common law-as well as civil and Jewish law-as
cyclical in nature. This article will examine Isaacs's cycle theory and its
implications for legal theory and legal reasoning. It will be argued that the
theory suggests that all forms of legal reasoning are present in all eras of
legal thought.
Before beginning the analysis of Maine and Isaacs's theories of legal
evolution, it may be best to ask the question: what is meant by legal
evolution? Legal evolution may be studied at numerous levels-of which,
three levels can be easily discerned-such as the level of doctrine (expansion
of duress to include economic duress), paradigm shifts within an area of law
(the "replacement" of products liability based on negligence to one based on
strict liability), and broad changes across the law (movement of legal
reasoning from a stage of formalism to one of realism or contextualism).
Professor Stephen Waddams recently offered an example of doctrinal change
by reviewing English case law relating to the evolution of unjust enrichment
(second level change in an area of law) and the doctrine of frustration (first
level or specific doctrinal change).9
7. Roscoe Pound noted that the transition of America from a largely agrarian society to an
industrial one required the law to adjust from free contracting to a greater regulation of contracting
(status):
[I]n rural, pioneer, agricultural America there was no call to limit the contracts a laborer might
make as to taking his pay in goods. To have imposed a limitation would have interfered with
individual freedom of industry and contract without corresponding gain in securing some other
interest. On the other hand, in industrial America of the end of the nineteenth century, a regime
of unlimited free contract between employer and employee in certain enterprises led not to
conservation but to destruction of values.... Hence we began to put limits to liberty of contract
between employer and employee ....
Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1, 4 (1943).
8. lsaacs's cycle theory of legal evolution is explored in his two-part article. lsaacs, Law of
Change, supra note 3.
9. Stephen Waddams, "Revolutions in the Classification of Obligations," Address at Obligations
VII Conference, Cambridge, UK (Sept. 9, 2016) (manuscript on file with author).
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Waddams provides a localized view of what he phrases as legal
evolution. He looks at the mid-nineteenth century view that obligations fell
into only two categories--contract and tort, leaving causes or actions based
upon unjust enrichment to flounder.' ° This simplification of obligations
resulted in the insertion of unjust enrichment-or to make the incorporation
more palatable, the use of the label quasi-contract-into the domain of
contract. In order to accomplish this feat, the law had to imply a promise by
seeing the unjust enrichment as creating a debt, which then implies a promise
to repay. This maneuver impacted the functionality of the excuse doctrines.
Despite the longstanding precedent in Taylor v. Caldwell2 recognizing the
doctrine of impossibility, as well as in the previous frustration cases, the
court in Chandler v. Webster 3 held that the payment on a room overseeing a
much anticipated procession was not refundable because it was a payment in
advance and the excuse doctrines only applied to relieving a party from
future performance and not that part of the contract already performed. The
court's reasoning was based upon implied contractual intent.
However, the jurisprudence on Krell v. Henry4 (frustration of purpose),
which was decided a year before Chandler, under the implied promise theory
of unjust enrichment in which one rationale for granting an excuse due to
frustration was to prevent unjust enrichment. Krell was based upon the same
fact pattern, the renting of a room in order to view a coronation procession,
as was the case in Chandler. The crucial difference, under the reasoning of
Chandler, was that in Krell the room owner sued for full payment, while in
Chandler the renter sued for a refund. But, under the logic subsequently
associated with Krell, the reasoning in Chandler was faulty given that the
result was the unjust enrichment of the room owner.
Chandler, long discredited, was officially overturned forty years later by
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. "
Waddams summarizes the holding as follows: "A claim lay for recovery of
advance payments in cases of frustration, not on the basis of the intention of
the parties, but on the extracontractual principle of 'total failure of
consideration.' This was the ground of restitution for avoidance of unjust
enrichment." 6 The lesson learned is that formalism often ties itself into knots
of inconsistency, or what Waddams calls, "the dangers of adopting too rigid
a scheme of classification," instead of achieving its goals of bringing
consistency and predictability to the law. In thinking of common law as a
slow process of incremental change, in Waddams view, Fibrosa overturning
of the Chandler ruling was nothing less than a "revolution" in judicial
thinking. I would submit that the overturning of Chandler, after forty years,
is better classified as incremental in nature, especially given the context of
the parallel development of the doctrine of frustration of purpose. However,
10. 1d.
11. Id. (citing STEPHEN LEAKE, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (197!)).
12. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 312; 3 B. & S. 826, 832-34.
13. Chandler v. Webster [ 190411 KB 493, 501 (Eng.).
14. Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 (Eng.)
15. Fibrosa Spolka v. Fairbarn Lawson Combe Barbour [1943] AC 32, 33 (HL).
16. Waddams, supra note 9, at 12.
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Waddams hits on the key force or element that underlies incremental and
epochal change: "Revolutions in legal thinking have often been prompted by
the need to avoid practical consequences considered to be absurd, or for other
reasons intolerable." 7 This "need" may produce change at any of the
different levels of legal evolution.
Another crucial lesson to be learned from Waddam's example is that if
incremental change stayed abreast with real world developments and
actively removed inconsistencies in the law brought about by legal
formalism, then the need for epochal change in the law may be avoided. Of
course, epochal change in the law may still be needed to respond to sudden,
radical changes in society, such as was seen during the Great Depression.
Alternatively, if the law becomes drastically out of sync with societal
developments, then the epochal change needed in the law is due to its
becoming obsolete through failure to make necessary incremental changes,
such was the case when the Uniform Sales Act of 1906"8 (and other obsolete
model commercial laws, such as the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act of
1896, Warehouse Receipt Act of 1909, Uniform Bills of Lading Act of 1919,
and so forth) was drafted in the area of legal formalism' 9 and was replaced
by an expansive Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).2° In sum, epochal
change in law or legal reasoning may be brought about by the law's
17. Id. at9.
18. The Uniform Sales Act of 1906 was written by Samuel Williston and was enacted into law by
thirty-four states between 1906 and 1947. It can be considered a precursor to Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) since it was the first widely adopted uniform sales law even though it was based
upon the obsolete common law of sales of the nineteenth century. See Kevin M. Teeven, A History of
Legislative Reform of the Common Law of Contract, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 35 (1994).
19. See Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 441 (1979). Gilmore is fully supportive on the notion of cyclical change: "Perhaps we are doomed
to live through alternating half centuries of activism and formalism." Id. at 441. He than analyzes
Negotiable Instruments Law and asserts that even in such an area of law where formalism is a necessity,
lack of law reform results in irrelevancy. After destroying the credibility of the Negotiable Instrument
Law of 1896 as a pro-bank creation, Gilmore then criticizes Article 3 of the UCC, which by 1979 he
argues had become: "a museum of antiquities-a treasure house crammed full of ancient artifacts whose
use and function have long been forgotten." Id. at 46 1.
20. lsaacs was a staunch supporter for the revision of commercial law. Lsaacs described the 1906
Uniform Sales Act as a standardized contract, which had the unfortunate draw back "that the contract
made for us by the Sales Act might not under a given set of conditions be the contract that we would have
made for ourselves if the various points had been called to our attention." Nathan Isaacs, Address Before
the Rochester Association of Purchasing Agents: Some Legal Aspects of Purchasing 3 (Nov. 16, 1932)
(on file with Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 3, File: Speeches,
1934); see also Nathan lsaacs, The Dealer-Purchaser, I U. CtN. L. REV. 373 (1927). In short, the Sales
Act was hopelessly obsolete and needed to be replaced by a modem law. We see here the notion of what
is now called the "hypothetical bargain." See David Chamy, Hypothetical Bargains The Normative
Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991) [hereinafter Chamy, Hypothetical
Bargains] (hypothetical bargain formulation conceals a complex set of issues). One can also argue that it
is at this point we see the beginning of a paradigm shift between classical to neo-classical contract law.
Llewellyn's subsequent incorporation of a contextual interpretive methodology into the UCC was an
attempt to continually refresh default rules. In this way, contract law's default rules would continue to
mimic the hypothetical bargain. Llewellyn and lsaacs believed that classical interpretive methodology,
such as the plain meaning and four-comers interpretive techniques, often failed to get to the true meaning
of the contract.
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obsolescence or by a sudden dramatic change in society. This Article
analyzes legal change from the broadest possible context-the evolution of
common law and common law reasoning over time.
Another "micro" example involves the parol evidence rule. Professors
Robert Childres and Stephen Spitz stated that despite its formal, fixed-rule
nature, the doctrine is partially status-based when applied by the courts.2
That is, even though the formal rule is status neutral, courts depend on the
characteristics of the parties, and apply the rule differently based on status.
They noted the persistence of the importance of status through an analysis of
the parol evidence rule, by showing that the exclusion or admission of parol
evidence was dependent on the status of the parties. The rule states that parol
evidence is admissible in cases where the issue is whether a contract has or
has not been concluded or is voidable; to show the parties intended their
written instrument to be only a partial integration of their agreement; and as
an aid to the interpretation of the contract.
Childress and Spitz show that parol evidence was more likely to be
admitted in cases of abuse of bargaining power and excluded in commercial
contracts. This is an example where a formal rule (law in the books) may be
different than the rule (law as applied or in action). The formal rule may seem
to be a bright line-a fixed rule in which one size fits all-but the operative
rule is based on a factors analysis not expressly provided for in the formal
rule. The lesson to be learned here is that free contract and status may play
roles in the formation and application of same rule-the contract norm is
expressed in the formalization of the rule and the status norm works covertly
in the application of the rule.22
It is this divergence between formal and operative rules that Isaacs's
cycle theory is based. For example, contract law only remains useful when it
is updated to remain relevant to changes in society. If this revision of law is
not properly maintained then the rules and principles that embody the law
become anachronistic. The divergence of law and real world practice widens
to a degree where the law no longer reflects contemporary business and life.
The rules and principles are no longer predictive of decisions in cases.23 The
21. See Robert Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
14-17 (1972).
22. Katharina Schmidt creates a general typology of modem transactional versus standardization-
relational contracting into of contract-status and status-contract categories. Consumer standardized
contracts would be of the genus of status-contracts where consumer choice is limited and may require
additional status-based protections. Other types of contracts, sometimes, but not always between parties
of relatively equal bargaining power, are based only formal (often highly detailed) contracts, but
subsequently [are] governed by 'status'-like or relational elements," such as long-term supply or licensing
and franchise contracts. Katharina Isabel Schmidt, Henry Maine's "Modern Law": From Status to
Contract and Back Again?, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 145, 179 (2017). 1 would add that the very meaning of
status, and inescapably contract, change over time in response to societal needs, so the pendulum may
swing back and forth and at the same time move progressively due to the changing meanings of status-
contract.
23. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce L. Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1067 (2006) (empirical analysis showing that
procedural and not substantive unconscionability factors were more predictive of claims of
unconscionability).
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rules or principles are ignored, subject to creative interpretation or fictions,
subject to equitable modification, or are covertly replaced by operative
rules. 24 Eventually, the divergence is narrowed through legislative fiat or by
judicial destruction and creation (overturning of precedent or the creation of
new principles and rules).
A. OF MAINE AND ISAACS
One important distinction needs to be made before the analysis begins.
The distinction is between what Maine's works-including his famous
aphorism in Ancient Law-mean (or what he intended them to mean) when
taken as a whole and not just through the lens of Ancient Law, and what his
"status-to-contract" assertion came to personify in legal scholarship. The
iconic statement by Maine that movement from "status to contract"
characterizes legal development in progressive societies is simply a
caricature of the generality and nuance of Maine's thesis. 25 First, his starting
point for analyzing a status relationship were ancient, patriarchal societies
where a person's rights were totally dependent on his or her position in the
societal hierarchy. Any reasonable analysis of such societies that existed
centuries and millennia before his writing and the mid-nineteenth century
would support the status-to-contract description of legal development.
Thus, the long historical sweep of Maine's study of ancient societies does
not preclude the continued importance of status in progressive or modern
societies, and for that matter, nothing precludes the remixing of status and
contract during different eras of the law. Status in Maine's Ancient Law refers
to the most extreme of status-based societies where women were treated as
property and a person's status was set at birth with little subsequent
opportunity for upward mobility.
Second, the nuance of Ancient Law is that it clearly does not equate
regulation of contracts with status. The notion of contract in Ancient Law
must be viewed in relationship to the extreme and restrictive nature of status
in ancient societies. Contract represented the rise of individualism where
people could determine their own destinies outside of the crushing
24. See Elizabeth Warren, Formal and Operative Rules Under Common Law and Code, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 898 (1983).
25. Professor Versteeg rightly notes that Maine's status-to-contract adage was taken out of context
of his analysis found in Ancient Law and has been hijacked to mean that law is constantly evolving from
status to contract. It was Maine's intent to show that in ancient societies persons were limited by their
status in the collective, while in modem societies people are freer to change their status through contracts.
Maine did not mean that contract meant absolute freedom of contract. J. Russell VerSteeg, From Status
to Contract: A Contextual Analysis of Maine's Famous Dictum, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 669, 679 (1989)
(the fact that contract rules change in order to protect the vulnerable does not necessarily show that from
the broad sweep of history that societies have moved to a contract-based system of relationships; status
in ancient times generally precluded free contracting to large segments of the population, such as women
and slaves).
26. "On the whole, the broad history of humanity, the narrower history of Europe, and the
transformation of tribal society under the influence of contact with other societies fulfill [Maine's]
generalization." Robert Redfield, Maine's Ancient Law in the Light of Primitive Societies, 3 W. POL. Q.
574, 588-89 (1950).
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restrictions of familial-controlled societies. Thus, status and contract for
Maine were viewed in the context of the anti-individualism of patriarchal
power structures of ancient societies in which an individual's status was
predetermined by her placement within that structure, and contract as a
power structure in which individuals create their own obligations and
reality.27 The idea that Maine somehow was advocating for a regime of
unlimited freedom of contract, free of any sort of government regulation, is
a historical fabrication. This Article is about the fabrication-the Maine
Thesis, as used here, refers to the caricature that law moves progressively
from status to contract. However, one bit of equivocation is in order before
moving on. Even though the assertion of a progressive movement from status
to contract, upon which this Article is partially based, is not sustainable, the
"status-to-contract" adage still retains normative power. Maine was
undertaking an exercise in legal history, but the "truth" of status to contract
may be found in its normative dimension. That is, his aphorism is commonly
construed as descriptively wrong, but if viewed from a normative perspective
then its purpose gains salience-namely, that at best, society is one in which
there is free contracting available to all people, independent of status
considerations. This is not antithetical to the continued role that status should
continue to provide certain protections from abuse of freedom of contract.
But, status concerns aside, the core paradigm of legal evolution remains the
advancement of private autonomy through the free creation of contractual
rights.
The legal evolution that Maine describes in Ancient Law is not directly
challenged in this Article.28 Whether legal development is generally
progressive begs the question of what is the nature of that progression? The
nature of that progression as a movement from status to contract is what
Isaacs's cycle theory rejects. Maine's thesis is that progressive societies
eventually strip away status-based relationships and replace status with a
generic freedom of contract where the characteristics of the contracting
parties become irrelevant. Isaacs argues that, taken from a broad historical
context, legal development is best characterized as cyclical in nature. 29 In
sum, legal development is in perpetual motion moving between status- and
contract-based relationships, generally reflected in relationships that blend
contract and status elements. It is interesting to note that both Maine and
Isaacs's works were undertakings in legal history and both took broad
historical perspectives to their subject. The difference is that Maine
compared two distinct eras of time-ancient societies with modern societies
(the nineteenth century).3 In contrast, Isaacs studied the development of law
27. "What Maine really intended with his juxtaposition of status and contract had been to draw
attention to the contrast between 'primitive' collectivism and progressive individualism." Schmidt, supra
note 22, at 155.
28. MAiNE, ANCIENT LAW, supra note 2, at 126, 128, 168-69.
29. Another example of a cycle theory or the evolution as a pendulum swinging between two poles
is Herbert Spencer's notion of evolution as cycles of "Integration and Disintegration." HERBERT SPENCER,
FIRST PRINCIPLES § 95 at 258-59 (6th ed. 1901) [hereinafter SPENCER, FIRST PRINCIPLES] (Herbert
Spencer applied Darwinian thought to social change).
30. The importance of Ancient Law is that is that it was a path breaking work of comparative law
and not a detailed history of the evolution of a single legal system; Frederick Pollock noted that the
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over time through various legal traditions--common, civil, and most
importantly, the longer duration of the Jewish legal tradition. It is through
the study of the development of these traditions that he finds the
commonality of cyclical change between status and contract.
This Article will focus mostly on the legal development of contract law.
Roger Cotterrell notes that, "at the most basic level contract is the legal
concept which most directly links law and economy because of the
significance of the numerous forms of exchange transactions for economic
development."'" Based upon this assessment, the development of contract
law in the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries will act as a surrogate of
legal development in general and will be used to understand the ebbs and
flows of different modes of legal reasoning.
Part II will review theories of development inside and outside the legal
academy. This review is premised on two core issues. First, is legal
development best characterized by a linear progression (status to contract)
or by a cyclical process (status to contract to status)? Second, is this
progression gradual due to the nature of the common law or is it subject to
periods of rapid change or jumps? Part III provides the framework for
Isaacs's cycle theory through the review and recognition of evolutionary
patterns in Jewish law. Isaacs's knowledge of Jewish law influenced his view
of secular law. Part IV explores the relationship between status and contract
law. Part V argues that cycle theory's implications for legal theory is that it
falsifies the dichotomies of contract law and many of the pseudo-debates
found throughout twentieth century legal scholarship. This approach is based
upon three core tenets: (1) contract law is dynamic in nature; (2) contract
law's complexity provides ample space for different theories, models, and
norms; and (3) because of the first two tenets, the dichotomies debated in
legal scholarship are false. In the end, these tenets demonstrate that law is
not a pure creation of induction, but takes inductive input and uses historical
principles to guide legal change. It concludes with the proposition that legal
development can best be understood as progressive-cyclical in nature; that
is, despite the cyclical nature of legal change, law remains progressive as its
cyclical movements act like a bicycle's wheel moving the rider forward.
B. IMPORTANCE OF ISAACS
Isaacs's work is valuable because, with the aid of a long comparative
law perspective encompassing thousands of years and different legal
systems, he detected the cyclical nature of legal change. Isaacs's argument
is that law cycles between eras of status and contract and between periods in
which strict law predominates and then melds into periods of equity, which
"Ancient Law is of permanent importance as a leading type of the comparative method which has in the
present generation become familiar." SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, OXFORD LECTURES AND OTHER
DISCOURSES 152 (1890).
31. ROGER COTTERRELL, LIvtNG LAW: STUDIES [N LEGAL AND SOCIAL THEORY 171 (2008)
[hereinafter COTFERRELL, LIVING LAW].
2018]
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in turn evolves back to an age of strict law-a "self-repeating" cycle.32 The
swinging back and forth between strict law and equity appears within the
context of a larger cycle of "codification, fictions, equity, legislation, [return
to] codification ... and so on."33 In Isaacs's nomenclature, legislation does
not refer to the statutory enactment of laws, but more generally to the
enactment of law whose "obligatory force is independent of general
principles. 34 When Isaacs used the term codification he did not mean solely
the enactment of legislation on a broad scale, but the "crystallization of law
into hard and fast rules definitely stated,"35 whether by judicial- or
legislative-made law.
In an age of strict law, Isaacs argues that the methodological methods of
a writer of glosses on an authoritative text would predominate. These
methods primarily focus on the "true" or literal meaning of the words of the
authoritative texts and the use of legal fictions to stretch the meanings of
those words to address contemporary problems. 3' A period of equitable relief
ensues when legal fictions are no longer able to bridge the gap between law
and reality. The unraveling of a formal rule begins when jurists take the
"point of view that is concerned with the subject matter rather than words,
with the purposes of law rather than its method, its spirit rather than its letter,
32. The idea of law as developing in cycles or as pendulum swings from one pole (contract) to the
other pole (status) continues to be a theme in legal scholarship. Professor Bergman discusses the Maine
Thesis as follows:
Contrary to Maine's thesis, the movement from status to contract is not historical or one-
directional; it is dialectical. Contract frees the individual from traditional sources of communal
obligation and allows him to invent new forms of social organization. During periods of social
change, status therefore will give way to contract. Once social change has been effectuated,
however, status considerations will reemerge to endow the new social organization with
cultural legitimacy. But because status stultifies social organization, precluding adaptation to
changed circumstances, contract will reemerge as the dominant adjudicative criterion.
Matthew P. Bergman, Status, Contract, and History: A Dialectical View, 13 CARDOzO L. REv. 171,
172 (1991). Bergman in making the above argument refers back to Issacs's seminal article, The
Standardizing of Contracts. Bergman refers to the work of lsaacs in supporting a dialectical theory of
status-contract relations: "Writing in the early-twentieth century, Professor Isaacs addressed Maine's
status-contract model. Criticizing Maine's status-contract progression, he argued: '[L]egal history has
room not merely for one single line of progress in one direction or the other, but for a kind of pendulum
movement back and forth between periods of standardization and periods of individualism."' Bergman at
179, quoting Nathan lsaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 40 (1917) [hereinafter
Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts]. Bergman reasserts Isaacs's Thesis when he states: "Status and
contract therefore coexist in a precarious state of moving equilibrium, alternating in primacy with the
economic and cultural needs of the particular epoch." Bergman at 181.
33. Isaacs, Law of Change, supra note 3, at 666. See also id. at 669 (table of legal evolution).
34. Id. at 669.
35. After the period of codifying fixed rules new fact patterns evolve that do not fit the fixed rules.
The result is the stretching of the rules to fit the new cases through the use of fictions. Isaacs attributes
this phase of legal development to Maine. But he takes issue with Maine's proposition that the use of
fictions were found in ancient societies. Under Isaacs's cycle theory, fictions are used throughout legal
history including in advanced legal systems. ld. at 666-67.
36. lsaacs calls this phase of legal development by the word "literalism" for which he means
"word study." Id. at 667, 669.
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its principles rather than its rules."37 The phase of commentary by glossators
is one of obsession with "text" and "technical rules," while the equitable
phase of law uses "common sense" and "fundamental principles" to prevent
the persistence of unjust outcomes caused by the formal application of
technical rules.3"
The problem with Isaacs's writing style was that his script provided
straightforward meaning by the recitation of "facts," but masked more
esoteric meanings.39 An assistant of Isaacs acknowledged that Isaacs's
writing utilized "successive layers of meaning" in which "It]he ostensible
meaning will always make sense" but that ostensible meaning is "often
almost contradictory to the ultimate or real meaning."4 In viewing his body
of work as a whole, elements of Isaacs's academic and intellectual agenda
become more apparent. For example his cycle theory of legal development
in Jewish law is supported by the work of Isadore Twersky some fifty years
after Isaacs advanced his undeveloped thesis.4 1 Twersky asserted that a
careful study of Jewish law reveals its "see-saw tendency" through an
ongoing process of "formal codification," with "alternate counter-attempts
to preserve the method and fullness of the [Law] by engaging in
interpretation, analogy, logical inference, and only then formulating the
resultant normative conclusion. A code would provide 'guidance and
certitude for a while but not finality.'"'42 However, Twersky's study focused
on the cycles found in post-Talmudic history, while Isaacs presented a
historical account of the history of Jewish Law before and after Biblical
times.43 Twersky's analysis of Jewish law treats Biblical law as a separate
and independent subject, while Isaacs's cycle theory shows that much of
Jewish law developed prior to the Biblical era.
Isaacs's view on the work of Maine is generally positive. Isaacs's
contributions include: (1) Maine's stages of legal development continuously
reoccur; (2) law cycles apply to all legal systems; and (3) each cycle is
generally progressive in nature, but not every part of a cycle is necessarily
progressive.' Isaacs argued that the stages of legislation, codification, and
37. By equity, Isaacs means the period in which the words or fixed rules can no longer be stretched
to real world developments through word study or fictions. The phase of equity introduces discretion into
the legal system through the study of the principles that underlie the rules and the quest to respond to real
world developments through the spirit and not the letter of the law. Id. at 668-69.
38. Id.
39. Flaks, Law, Religion, and Pluralism, supra note 1, at 315.
40. Flaks, Law, Religion, and Pluralism, supra note I, at 308 (citing Albert M. Freiberg, Nathan
Isaacs in Cambridge 6 (July 15, 1952), in ISAACS COLLECTED PAPERS VOL. l, JEWISH SUBJECTS (on file
at Nathan Isaacs Papers, Hebrew College, Newton Centre, MA)). I would like to thank Samuel Flaks for
pointing out this source.
41. Isadore Twersky, The Shulhan 'Aruk: Enduring Code of Jewish Law, 16 JUDAISM 141 (1967),
reprinted in ISADORE TWERSKY, STUDIES IN JEWISH LAW AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 130 (1982).
42. Id. at 138.
43. See generally The History of Jewish Law, in THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW (Menachem
Elon trans., 1975) (outlining a periodization of Jewish Law very similar to lsaacs) (thanks to Samuel
Flaks for this reference).
44. See Adolph S. Oko, 'The Law'and the Law of Change: A Tentative Study in Comparative
Jurisprudence: Introduction, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 662 (1917) (Introduction to lsaacs's article on the
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hermeneutical study of texts do not occur in a single order, but instead in a
repeating cycle. Although others have recognized the different eras of legal
history, Isaacs's precise formulation of the process as one of repeating cycles
is distinctive. The distinctiveness of his work and its applicability to most
legal systems is seen in his comparative study of legal scholarship published
in a 1918 issue of the Harvard Law Review.4 5 In that article he traces schools
ofjurisprudence. Most notably, he summarizes that the Historical School of
nineteenth-century Germany "sought to locate the sources of law in historical
practice and precedent, in the character of the native Volkgeist and the
language in which it expressed itself. '46 The most prominent leaders of the
Historical School were Friedrich Karl von Savigny in Germany and Sir
Henry Maine in England.47 Savigny claimed that there is an "organic
connection between law and the nature and character of a people. '48
According to von Savigny, sources of law are found in the historical roots of
a culture or what is known as customary law. 49
The Historical School believed that there was change in the law, but that
it was a gradual change and could not be forced. Moreover, the Historical
School believed that law progressed from the primitive to the more
sophisticated. Hegel too believed in progressive legal evolution, but he also
argued that earlier stages of society reflected the universal spirit of right,
even if not in an ultimately perfected form."° Isaacs adopted the contributions
of the Historical School inasmuch as he recognized that change in the law
was deeply attached to the fate of peoples; but he took a Neo-Hegelian
approach in that he believed that there was such a thing as universal
principles of justice and that justice did not merely mirror the existing laws
of a people, but rather the laws of people were constantly being adjusted to
better reflect those universal principles given changing societal
developments. Thus, a change in society with a resulting change in the law,
but away from the universal principles ofjustice, meant that legal evolution,
"Law of Change," supra note 3). Referencing lsaacs, Oko states his own view that: "The recurrent cycles
do present an upward development: recurrent, they start from the comparatively higher order which has
previously been attained." Id. This does not mean that a given cycle or part of a cycle could be regressive
in nature. Further referencing Isaacs, Oko states that Isaacs "does not think of the cycles as stratified
layers, nor of their recurrence as a kind of Pythagorean Apokatastasis." Id.
45. Nathan Isaacs, The Schools of Jurisprudence: Their Places in History and Their Present
Alignment, 31 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1918).
46. G. Heiman, The Sources and Significance of Hegel's Corporate Doctrine, in HEGEL'S
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 113 (Z.A. Pelczynski ed., 1971).
47. CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 138-39
(2d ed., 1963).
48. Id. at 139 (citing FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, GESCHICHTE DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS IM
MITTELALTER "Forward" (6 vol. 1815-31)).
49. Von Savigny viewed that true law was found in the slow growth of customary law: "[A]II law
is originally formed in the manner, in which, in ordinary but not quite correct language, customary law is
said to have been formed: i.e. that it is first developed by custom and popular faith, next by
jurisprudence,-everywhere, therefore, by internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of
a law-giver." FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND
JURISPRUDENCE 30 (Abraham Hayward trans., 1831).
50. THE SOURCES AND HEGEL'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES (Z.A.
Pelczynski ed., 1971).
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at least at a given point of time, could be regressive. Unlike the Historical
School, he did not believe that historical development would reach an
endpoint. Isaacs's idea of cycles is much more akin to that of Hegel's
unending cycles of law, history, and reason.
C. BRIEF SUMMARY OF CYCLE THEORY
Isaacs, in his 1917 two-part article 'The Law'and the Law of Change,51
accepts Maine's general notion that law evolves in order to be in harmony
with society through movement from legal fictions, equity, and legislation.
The movement occurs when law diverges overtime with societal practices,
but is then made to work through the use of legal fictions, when the fictions
run out, then equity is used to prevent injustice;52 eventually the chaos of ad
hoc justice requires legislative action, either by statute or through judge-
made law. Isaacs added a fourth stage by labeling the "given law" as
codification, meaning "a crystallization of law into hard and fast rules
definitely stated."53 Maine's Thesis asserts that the movement or cycle is
more of a single occurrence, as he compared single points of time (ancient
law versus modem law). Isaacs saw law as a continuous series of cycles that
occur throughout time (cycles during the period of ancient law and cycles in
modem law). Isaacs is valuable because his analysis, initially based on his
study of the evolution of Jewish law and then applied to the common law,
was from a much broader, continuous perspective than that of Maine.
Cycle theory provides a perspective in assessing other theories and
debates in the contract law literature. Isaacs saw his theory equally applicable
to the common, civil, and Jewish legal traditions. It is from Isaacs's historical
knowledge of Jewish legal development that he saw the idea of a linear
progression from status to contract as an illusion. The shift from equitable
contract law of the eighteenth century (requirement of relative equality of
the exchange), to the rise of individualism (even a peppercorn is legally
sufficient consideration) at the end of the century, was clearly a shift from
status to contract.54 But, viewed historically it is but one of many such shifts.
In broad stokes, in the last few centuries, status was represented by the fact
that consideration prior to the nineteenth century needed to be of relative
equality (from a societal point of view) in order to be legally sufficient. By
the end of the century, laissez-faire economics focused on the individual's
value of consideration leading to the expunging of adequacy of consideration
51. Isaacs, Law of Change, supra note 3.
52. Isaacs states that when strict application of law begins to produce injustice there is a "desire
to breathe the freer air of general principles comes to all peoples who have suffered from the choking
atmosphere of too many particular rules." Id. at 668.
53. Id. at 666.
54. Professor James Gordley states: "Pre-nineteenth-century jurists and philosophers developed
the doctrine of equality in exchange by drawing upon two different authorities. One was a theory of
exchange proposed by Aristotle in his Nichomachean Ethics; the other was a Roman text in the Corpus
iuris civilis of Justinian, which provided a legal remedy for those who sold land at less than half its just
price." James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1588 (1981).
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and the need for fairness of exchange from the consideration doctrine.5 5
Thus, as Lon Fuller asserted in 1941, the requirement of consideration was
no longer one of substance, but had been reduced to mere formality.56 The
twentieth century has seen a partial return to status with the consumer
replacing the farmer or serf as a focus of paternalism. This shift in American
law is seen in Karl Llewellyn's adoption of the merchant-consumer
distinction in the UCC; the evolution of unconscionability, originally found
in equity, to being recognized in law; proliferation of consumer protection
laws; and the adoption of the duty of good faith as an implied term in all
contracts.
In contract law, without attempting to attribute an idea to one tradition
over the other, or to provide evidence of transplantation or borrowing, the
Jewish responsa57 (case law) literature shows a great deal of commonality
with the common law, and also offers insight into how the common law
developed. One explanation for the commonality is that the case-based
process of Jewish and common law inherently evolved in an efficient or, in
the alternative, fairness-centered way. The connection between the Jewish
responsa and English common law is only relevant here for purposes of
explaining Isaacs's notion of legal cycles.
If one accepts the idea of legal cycles, then contract law's great
dichotomies dissolve into continuums. At any given time, a legal shift may
favor contract over status, formalism over realism, literalism over
contextualism, facilitation over regulation, and rules over standards,
followed by a subsequent shift in the other direction. Any such shift is only
a partial movement. Contract law will always remain a mixture of rules and
standards, status and contract, formal and contextual interpretation, and so
forth. These shifts may occur gradually as the traditional view of the case-
based system depicts or quickly in response to external shocks, such as the
industrial revolution, financial crises, and the advent of the Internet.
Any theory of legal evolution must be broad in scope in which, in the
present case, nuance is dissolved in the sweep of Jewish and common law
history; but through a sampling of the historical record, the battle between
status and contract becomes apparent, and the seemingly endless thrusts to
and fro from the different sides of competing contract law theories and
debates can be distilled. A look at the contract law literature from the
beginning of the twentieth century to the present reflects the legal cycles that
Isaacs saw unfolding over the course of millennia. In the end, this Article
abandons all tethering to theory, as such, in favor of an "all of the above"
model of legal development characterized by cyclical and mostly,
progressive developments in law. The only support to be offered here for the
55. "In the nineteenth century, jurists confidently abandoned this principle [equality of exchange].
Some argued that equality in the values exchanged was a meaningless concept; others claimed that
judicial remedies were an unwarranted interference with the judgment of the parties." Id. at 1587.
56. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration andForm, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 800-04 (1941) [hereinafter
Fuller, Consideration and Form] (consideration as form serves three important functions--evidentiary,
cautionary, and channeling).
57. The responsa tradition in Jewish or Talmudic law is the counterpart of the common law's
precedent and case-based system of reasoning.
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progressive nature of legal development is that law that reflects real world
change is necessarily progressive in nature.
D. CYCLES AND CHANGE
To fully understand cycle theory, especially in the context of the common
law, the meaning of change that marks the process of recognizing a cycle
must be discerned. Isaacs's cycle theory is at its most plausible form when
two types of change are recognized: recurrent and epochal change, in which
both types of change are occurring at the same time or alternatively-one
can be seen as a process leading to the other. Recurrent meaning intermittent,
persistent, repeated change or the Latin recurrere meaning "to run back."
Epochal change, which I believe comes closer to Isaacs's view of legal
cycles, meaning the beginning of a distinctive period in legal history. In its
standard meaning, epoch has a beginning and end; a time when a thing
existed, such as the age of reason or the era of laissez-faire. In law, the
"thing" existed in some degree before and after the time that it had become
seen as epochal. Cycle theory plays a role in the effectuation of both types
of change. These types of change will be explored later in this Article.
II. LEGAL THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT
Roger Cotterrell sees legal development as a battle between different
ideologies. This is so because law both legitimates and channels power
structures in society: "Analysis of the historical patterns of the development
of legal doctrine is thus part of the field of study of the formation,
modification and disintegration of ideologies.""8 An example is the perceived
paradigm shifts from classical, to neoclassical, to modern eras of contracts. 9
It can be seen in methods of legal reasoning-from legal formalism to
realism-contextualism, and potentially in a return to formalism (neo-
formalism).6" This Part will review three approaches to legal development-
Henry Sumner Maine's progression thesis, Nathan Isaacs's cycle theory, and
law and economics' evolutionary efficiency model.
A. MAINE'S PROGRESSION
In relation to the evolution of the common law, two seemingly dyadic
views can be presented. The Mainesian view sees law as a gradual,
58. COTTERRELL, LIVING LAW, supra note 31, at 169-70.
59. See supra note 5. See also Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 3 (1980)
(eras of American legal thought); DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT
(1998) (Kennedy states: "The periodization I adopted was the conventional one for describing three
overlapping 'Ages American Law:' the period from the Revolution to the civil war (pre-Classical legal
thought); the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century (Classical Legal Thought or CLT); and the
'modem' period beginning before WWI and lasting to the present of 1975." Id. at x.
60. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541 (2003) (advocating a return to formalism in the interpretation of business contracts).
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progressive development. 6 This development results from a gradual
evolution of the common law. An alternative view of legal development
focuses on the contingent nature of the law. The gradual evolution of the
common law is premised on its ability to develop in an internally logical
manner. The alternative view sees not only gradual evolutionary change, but
also revolutionary change through "legal jumps" in response to seismic
events, such as the industrial revolution, the Great Depression, and the
creation of the Internet. The idea of legal jumps will be discussed later in this
Part. For now, the mainstream common law model is that of gradualism-
law changing in response to societal change, but only at an incremental rate.
Steven Morrison argues that legal systems are not inherently coherent,
therefore, incremental change is a poorer description of legal change than
more dramatic types of change caused by social and political conflicts:
One cannot find in legal systems an internal consistency, because legal
systems are determined by externalities, namely historical, social, and
political conflicts. [This realization results in the rejection of] the
Hartian notion, [] that "[t]o the extent that lawyers think historically
about the law, they tend to think in terms of the slow evolution of legal
forms from the crude to the sophisticated, and not in terms of the
particular connections between different legal forms and different
kinds of society."62
Whether by gradual means, jumps, or a combination of both, the core
part of Maine's Thesis remains that legal development is a linear
progression. The issue that remains is whether gradual progression from
lesser degrees of status protections to greater degrees of freedom of contract
is a plausible explanation of legal change.
Sociologists like Max Weber and Emile Durkheim lend support to the
important role of contract in modem societies, but both assert that increased
regulation of contracts will be needed. The importance of contract in creating
a modem marketplace was a common theme in the works of Max Weber. 63
Weber is in agreement with Maine that freedom of contract is a recent
61. Another example of a theory of evolutionary progression can be seen in the work of some law
and economics scholars that argue that the common law evolves to create more efficient rules in order to
reduce the costs or waste in transactions. Compare Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977) (stating more efficient rules are more likely to survive the making of
precedent), George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 65 (1977) (contending that litigation is more likely to contest and change inefficient rules), and
John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978)
(same), with Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996)
(arguing other factors weigh in the evolution of the common law, such as path dependence and random
shocks), and Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change
in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001) (path dependence).
62. Steven R. Morrison, Toward a History ofAmerican Criminal Law Theory, 32 U. LA VERNE L.
REV. 47, 83 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (2010), citing and quoting, ALAN NORRIE, CRIME,
REASON AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAW 8, 13 (Butterworth's 2d ed. 2001).
63. See MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans.,
Harvard University Press: Cambridge 1954) [hereinafter WEBER ON LAW N ECONOMY].
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development.64 In fact, Weber refers to earlier relations as "status contracts"
and those that relate to a market economy as "purposive contracts."65
Additionally, Weber recognized the facilitative and regulatory nature of
contract law. With the expansion of types of contractual transactions came a
need for more and more rules. The facilitative rules-the rules of ius
dispositivum-are known as default rules in modem nomenclature. The
primary function of contract law is to provide known rules that automatically
apply unless the contracting parties agree otherwise. However, certain issues
could not be left to contractual freedom. Therefore, a body of mandatory
rules-ius cogens-was needed to prevent harm produced by unlimited
freedom of contract.6 6
Emile Durkheim asserted that the expansion of the realm of contracts
was a necessary consequence of the specialization of labor as a society
moves from agrarian-based to industrial-based economies. 6' But, Durkheim
also saw the potential for abuse in an unregulated contract regime. The
expansion of the reach and importance of free contracts necessitated an
increase in "regulative action. 6 8 He argues that the more economically
advanced a society becomes, the greater the importance of contracts and the
greater the need for regulation: "[T]he division of labor produces solidarity.
. not only because it makes each individual an exchangist... it is because
it creates among men an entire system of rights and duties which link them
together in a durable way."69 In sum, Durkheim does not see contracts and
status as adversarial, but as the necessary products of the specialization of
labor. The popular notion of Maine's Thesis that status to contract was a zero
sum game-that as contract increased, status decreased-is not entirely
correct since Maine's "movement" was a more nuanced and more in line with
Durkheim's analysis.7" Maine's adage correctly stated that contract
relationships grow in importance relative to status with the creation of a
market economy. This is partially due to the fact that contract law is a tool
for creation; as a market economy develops, contract law is used in many
more types of transactions than existed in earlier times.7 But, nothing in
Maine's overall theory indicates that status will ever be totally expunged
from the law.
In sum, Maine's status-to-contract adage was likely meant to be a
generality and not advocacy for the extinguishment of all status-based
64. Weber states "[t]hat extensive contractual freedom which generally obtains today has ... not
always existed." Id. at 100 (alteration in original).
65. Id. at 105.
66. Id. at 126 & 126 n.67.
67. EMILE DURKHEIM, ON MORALITY AND SOCIETY 92 (Robert N. Bellah ed., 1973).
68. Id. at 101.
69. Id. at 143 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
70. Sir Frederick Pollock in eulogizing Maine and his work notes that Maine believed that the law
never stood still and that the movement forward was not a smooth transition: "As Maine himself said, the
principle of progress, which is the same thing as the law of healthy life, is a principle of 'destruction
tending to construction."' POLLOCK, supra note 30, at 166-67.
71. WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY, supra note 63, at 100 ("[w]ith every extension of the market.
legal transactions become more numerous and more complex").
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relationships, such as the special protections provided to minors in the
common law. In Frederick Pollock's "notes" to the 1963 Beacon edition of
Ancient Law, he surmises that "[s]tatus may yield ground to Contract, but
cannot itself be reduced to Contract.-72 Pollock gives as an example, the
evolution of the personality of the corporation. 73 The corporation as a legal
person is a status-based entity created by the State through incorporation
statutes and regulated by the status-based concept of fiduciary duties. In his
discussion of the continuing importance of status, Pollock intimates that the
status-to-contract notion was more rhetorical than literal.74 Pollock
concludes that Maine's historically overgeneralized "dictum" should be read
narrowly. He asserts that it is best left to the area of property law, such as the
move from the feudal system of fiefdoms to individual fee tail ownership. 75
B. ISAACS'S CYCLE THEORY
Before proceeding, a brief introduction to Nathan Isaacs and his
scholarship is needed. Isaacs was a prolific writer from 1914 to 1940.76 He
held a doctorate in economics and received his S.J.D. at Harvard Law School
under the tutelage of Dean Roscoe Pound.77 Isaacs was a scholar of powerful
intellect with broad-based knowledge of the Jewish, civil, and common law
traditions. His intellect produced a deep opus both in secular common law
and in Jewish literature. 78 For contract law aficionados, he is remembered as
the person who introduced the nomenclature of standard form contracting in
his 1917 article, The Standardizing of Contracts in the Yale Law Journal.79
For tort buffs, he advocated early in the twentieth century, the need to
recognize strict liability in certain areas of an industrialized economy.8 °
Those that work in arbitration law will be familiar with Isaacs's description
72. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, supra note 2, at 423 (alteration in original).
73. Id. at 423-24.
74. In fact, Maine's status-to-contract progression thesis appears as the last sentence of Chapter
5, and is never fully elaborated upon. Id. at 165. The importance of Ancient Law lies in its connection of
legal history to legal theory, as opposed to the ahistorical stance of much of legal theory. The work had
also had substantial impact on the disciplines of sociology and law, and law and anthropology. See
Stephen G. Utz, Maine's Ancient Law and Legal Theory, 16 CoNN. L. REV. 821 (1984).
75. Pollock's commentary on Ancient Law states that: "Maine's now celebrated dictum as to the
movement from Status to Contract in progressive societies is perhaps to be understood as limited to the
law of Property ...." MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, supra note 2, at 422. He further states that: "it does not
seem that a movement from Status to Contract can be asserted with any generality." Id. at 423. Pollock
gives examples marriage and the mortgage (with the mortgagor's right of redemption) as status based
relationships. Id. at 423-25.
76. For a fuller biography on Nathan Isaacs, see Samuel Flaks, Note, Nathan Isaacs's IDEIA:
Legal Evolution and Parental Pro Se Representation of Students with Disabilities, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS.
275 (2009) (provides biographical information and analyzes his cycle theory in relation to the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 or IDEIA); see also Larry A. DiMatteo & Samuel
Flaks, Beyond Rules, 47 Hous. L. REv. 297, 305-311 (2010) [hereinafter Beyond Rules] (brief biological
sketch).
77. See Samuel Flaks, Law, Religion, and Pluralism: The Thought and Experiences of Nathan
Isaacs (1886-1941), 29 TOURo L. REV. 307, 310-11 (2013).
78. Beyond Rules, supra note 76, at 312-24 ("Isaacs's Contributions to American Law").
79. Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, supra note 32.
80. Nathan Isaacs, Fault and Liability Two Views of Legal Development, 31 HARv. L. REV. 954
(1918); Nathan lsaacs, Quasi-Delict in Anglo-American Law, 31 YALE L.J. 571 (1922).
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of alternative models of the role of the arbitrator-the agency model and the
judicial model. He argued for the agency model, believing that the model of
arbitrator as judge would make arbitration litigation-like. He also argued for
limited judicial review of arbitration awards. The agency model would
become the standard interpretation of the 1926 American Federal
Arbitration Act. 81 In constitutional law he argued for a principles-based
interpretive methodology and against literal interpretation. He asserted that
after 150 years of existence, constitutional interpretation involved "trying to
get at the spirit of the thing, rather frankly confessing that the letter is not the
whole thing."82 This aligns with the now mainstream view that the
Constitution should be seen as a living document.
As the above paragraph notes, Isaacs wrote on numerous areas of law. In
at least four of those areas his works remain standard citations in American
law review articles to the present. However, few people make the connection
to his total body of work because of the specialization of legal research. Why
is Isaacs so unknown? Why isn't he recognized in the legal history canon for
the breadth and insightfulness of his work? Why isn't he recognized as an
important legal realist as is clearly shown in his writings? These are hard
questions to answer. Maybe the answer was that he was a professor at the
Harvard Business School and not at a law school. Maybe it was because his
articles were not very theoretical in nature.83 But, here is where I venture a
supposition that rests upon the difference between theory and insight. Even
though Isaacs's writings were filled with insights-many prophetic in
nature---on the surface they were relatively atheoretical in nature. This may
be the reason that he was not recognized, as he should have been, by his
contemporaries, while his insights remain important today and are evident in
the historical record.
Many of Isaacs's insights were based upon deep historical knowledge
and not concocted theory. Isaacs's cycle theory evolved through his in-depth
study of Jewish and secular legal systems; it suggests the commonality of
Jewish law or legal tradition and the common law. 4 The Jewish "common
law" or responsa and other sources of Jewish law often dealt with issues of
81. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1926).
82. Nathan Isaacs, Lecture on Legal History (Jan. 8, 1922) (transcript on file with Baker Library
Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 1, File). See also Nathan Isaacs, The Securities Act
and the Constitution, 43 YALE L.J. 218 (1933) (criticizing the Supreme Court for using fictions and
stretching the words of the Constitution beyond their normal meanings); Beyond Rules, supra note 76, at
353-56 (arguing for a principled approach to Constitutional interpretation).
83. Beyond Rules, supra note 76, at 302 ("he often disguised his theoretical insights under the
garb of doctrine"). The same was also said of the great contract scholar E. Allan Famsworth. See Larry
Garvin et al., Theory and Anti-Theory in the Work of Allan Farnsworth, 1 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1
(2006).
84. Nathan lsaacs, The Influence of Judaism on Western Law: A Gift Inter Fivos, in THE LEGACY
OF ISRAEL 377 (Edwyn R. Bevan & Charles Singer eds., 1927) [hereinafter Isaacs, Influence ofJudaism];
Nathan Isaacs, The Schools of Jurisprudence. Their Places in History and Their Present Alignment-The
Quarrels of the 'Schools,' 31 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1918) (stating that Jewish and Anglo-American systems
share many important characteristics).
85. Responsa translates into "answers." Jewish scholars provided these answers when an answer
was not readily apparent in the text of the Talmud. lsaacs "had what was probably the greatest existing
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commercial and contract law that predated the common law. Isaacs explained
the commonality of legal systems, especially in areas of commercial law, as
the product of the commonality of basic, universal principles that underlie
most developed legal systems. His contributions to Jewish law were also
contributions to common law; his Jewish scholarship clearly informed his
legal scholarship.8 6 He believed that cycle theory could be applied to most
legal systems. However, the primary focus of his analysis was the cyclical
nature of the Jewish and common law traditions.
The seeds of cycle theory are seen in Max Weber's insight that the
greater the contractual freedom the greater the level of coercion. In order to
prevent freedom of contract from being the singular domain of the powerful,
mandatory rules were needed: "A legal order which contains ever so few
mandatory and prohibitory norms and ever so many 'freedoms' and
'empowerments' can nonetheless in its practical effects facilitate a
quantitative and qualitative increase not only of coercion in general but quite
specifically of authoritarian coercion."8 7 A status relationship is a bundle of
mandatory norms or rules-at least in modern times-needed to protect the
weaker parties to contracts. Another rationale for cycle theory is the
importance of authoritative sources in legal decisions. The law or at least
those who apply it are in a constant search for authority. This search is
required by the internal component of law. The conceptual nature of law
requires any change in the law to be supported by and within that conceptual
system. Because of this, "law is typically backward-looking."88 In essence,
what is old is made new. This assures that the law-if not substantively, then
at least superficially-looks cyclical in nature.
Professor Weisbrod succinctly summarizes cycle theory as the view that
"one should get away from an idea of legal history progresses as movement
.. in one direction or another, and see 'a kind of pendulum movement back
and forth between periods of standardization and periods of
individualization."' 8 9 Indeed, Isaacs did not see the stages of cycle theory as
strict demarcations, but as overlapping through much of legal evolution.9"
Cycle theory of legal development seeks to discover universal principles of
law while allowing for constant change in the content of the law. Isaacs
collection of Rabbinic responsa." Nathan Isaacs, Nathan IsaacsArticles, in NATHAN ISAACS PAPERS Vol.
I at 5 (Cambridge, Harvard Law School, eds.). See generally THE RESPONSA PROJECT: THE GLOBAL
JEWISH DATABASE, http://responsa-forum.co.il/www/?page id=322& lang=en (last visited Jan. 23,
2018).
86. For a review of Isaacs's Jewish scholarship, see Flaks, Law, Religion, and Pluralism, supra
note 1.
87. WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY, supra note 63, at 191.
88. ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 119 (1985).
89. Carol Weisbrod, The Way We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts and Domestic
Arrangements, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 777, 788 (1994) [hereinafter Weisbrod, Way We Live] (quoting Isaacs,
The Standardizing of Contracts, supra note 32, at 40).
90. lsaacs saw the movement of law as swings between strict law and equity, with the swing
always being in a state of transition, meaning the law consists of various degrees of formalism and equity:
"It is submitted... that the periods of strict law and equity are composite and that the same component
parts are discernable in each recurrence, that a self-repeating cycle is the result, ..." lsaacs, Law of
Change, supra note 3, at 666.
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asserted that those changes are accomplished through a predictable set of
means that correlate to the different, but recurring, stages of how lawyers
approach their legal system.91 Since the law always returns to general
principles during a given cycle, it is the principles that need to be studied and
that act as guides in the formulation of new rules as law progresses through
the different phrases of each cycle. In comparison, since the progressive
theory of legal development has been accepted as canonical, legal scholars'
views of legal history are structured by this foundational premise. In sum,
the progressive theory of legal development biases the historical record to
support such a view. The danger of such bias is the diminishment of the need
to uncover underlying principles to guide legal change.
Instead of Maine's progression of status to contract, Isaacs's historical
research in Jewish and common law led him to believe that law developed
in cycles from status to contract and contract to status. He believed that the
history of the common, civil, and Jewish law is characterized by many such
cycles. Isaacs referred to status-based legal regimes as ones that encompass
standardized relationships and those that were primarily based on free
contract as characterized by individualized relationships.
92
Wilson Huhn's scheme, in which legal reasoning progresses through
three stages, provides an example of cycle theory in a microcosm. 93 He uses
the Dworkinian notion of "hard cases" as the impetus for change:
"examination of judicial opinions in hard cases reveals that courts progress
from formalism, to analogy, to realism, in resolving difficult questions of
law."94 However, Huhn's progression is ahistorical in that he asserts that
judges' progress through the three types of legal reasoning in singular cases.
From a historical vantage point all three types of reasoning play a role in
the evolution of law.95 Formalism recognizes the internal component of law
as a conceptual system based upon deductive reasoning. The maj or premise
being the law, the facts of the case being the minor premise, and the rule
application is the conclusion. The judicial decision is the application of an
existing rule of law by its terms to a set of facts.96 This approach views the
text-contract law rules and private contracts-as providing an internal
means of interpretation. Pure formalism is the direct application of rule to
91. Different schools of thought, such as strict law versus equity or formalism versus
contextualism, compete against one another at any one time. In the end the schools are bridged by
focusing not on the words of law but on the purpose of law: "It is a point of view that is concerned with
the subject matter rather than the words, with the purposes of the law rather than its method, its spirit
rather than its letter, its principles rather than its rules. It is an appeal from the text to common sense, from
technical rules to fundamental principles." Id. at 667.
92. Isaacs states that: "After all, the question is not so much one of status and contract as it is of a
broader classification that embraces these concepts: standardized relations and individualized relations."
Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, supra note 32, at 39. Under Isaacs's terminology standardized
contracts were status-based and individualized contracts were products of free contracting.
93. Wilson Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and Realism, 48 VILL. L.
REV. 305 (2003) [hereinafter Huhn, Stages of Legal Reasoning].
94. Id. at 305; see Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
95. Huhn, Stages of Legal Reasoning, supra note 93, at 305.
96. Id. at 309 (citing Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988)).
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case in which the reasoning is purely conceptual and deductive. The civil law
system with its direct appeal to a civil code, as the singular source of law, is
an example of such rule-to-case reasoning. The next step in the evolutionary
process is the use of analogical reasoning. Analogical reasoning allows for a
broader view of the law and the case facts. On the conceptual side, the judge
may look to different rules and apply them analogically to a novel case. But,
it is on the factual side where analogical reasoning is most used in the
common law. The judge searches previous case law to determine the proper
precedent to apply to the case at hand.97
The final stage of legal reasoning is based upon the need for the court to
look into the consequences of its rule applications. The need to apply a policy
analysis to weigh the benefits and costs of a ruling "emerged from the British
school of utilitarianism and the American philosophy of pragmatism." 98
However, Huhn's analysis of legal reasoning is not diachronic in nature. His
is a synchronic analysis of the judicial reasoning process in particular cases,
and not by implication a testament to the legal evolution from formalism to
realism. His judicial reasoning references the types of reasoning employed
in hard cases:
When faced with new fact situations, the reasoning of the courts
frequently follows a typical sequence. First, courts attempt to
formalistically apply existing rules of law according to their terms to
new facts. If the courts are unable to define the terms of existing rules
so that they apply to the new case, then the courts draw analogies
between the new situations and familiar ones, applying the existing
rules by analogy. If these analogies break down, courts fashion new
rules by means of a realistic balancing of policies and interests. 99
This summation of Huhn's three stages of legal reasoning makes a
number of things clear. First, even though it is not a theory of legal
development, it implicitly supports cycle theory. In different eras of legal
development these three types of reasoning change in importance or in the
degree in which they are "formally" utilized.
Grant Gilmore's 1979 tome, Ages ofAmerican Law,1"' divides American
legal evolution into different eras, provide moderate support for cycle theory.
Gilmore traces the shifting of American legal reasoning from the late
nineteenth century.101 The later part of the nineteenth century saw a shift to
greater freedom of contract and less judicial interventionism into private
contracts. This legal regime was characterized by the formalistic application
97. Id. at 312 (citing Emily Sherwin, A Defense ofAnalogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1179,1179 (1999)).
98. Id. at 316.
99. Id. at 379.
100. See GILMORE, AGES, supra note 5.
101. Gilmore divides American law into three distinct eras-the Age of Discovery (early nineteenth
century to the Civil War) involved the creation of the American legal system, the Age of Faith (later part
of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century) involved the development of the view of law as
science and the ascendancy of legal formalism, and the Age of Anxiety (post World War 1) involved the
rise of legal realism and the drafting of the UCC. GILMORE, AGES, supra note 5, at 40-87.
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of the rules of contract law. Beginning with the proto-Realists °2 in the early
twentieth century, and the advent of standard-form contracting, the reality of
bargaining disparities was recognized.I 3 The history of the twentieth century
shows a continuous movement away from pure laissez-faire formalism to
greater protection of weaker parties. The history at the turn of the twenty-
first century has seen increased scholarship advocating for a greater amount
of formalism in contract law application." 4 Thus, the general scheme of
cycles in the common law of contracts shifts between ages of formalism and
realism, law and equity, and status and contract.
C. EVOLUTIONARY EFFICIENCY
Judge Posner, among others, has argued that the common law is
generally made up of efficient rules: "The common law method is to allocate
responsibilities between people engaged in interacting activities in such a
way as to maximize the joint value, or, what amounts to the same thing,
minimize the joint cost of the activities." '10 5 The argument is that common
law judges, in applying rules, intuitively use an economic analysis. Thus,
theoretically, the common law should become more efficient over time. One
argument is, that through a process of natural selection, inefficient rules are
adjusted or replaced by more efficient rules.10 6 Professors Priest and Rubin
have argued in favor of this evolutionary efficiency theory of legal
development."°7 Rubin asserts that efficiency gains are mainly due to the
types of cases that parties decide to litigate. Cases where both contesting
102. The proto-realists questioned the internal coherency of the law and its ability to find
determinate answers through pure deductive reasoning. They were the predecessors to the Legal Realists
of the late 1920s and 1930s, and included Robert Hale, Morris and Felix Cohen, Wesley Hohfeld, Nathan
Isaacs, and Roscoe Pound, whose major works are found in the first two decades of the twentieth century,
as well as the early 1920s.
103. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL.
SCd. Q. 470 (1923) (arguing courts enforcement of contract rights is inherently coercive; over interpreting
freedom of contract masks the coercive power of the state).
104. The advocacy of a less contextual, more formal interpretation of contracts has been labeled
"neo-formalism." See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) ("[T]he word
'formalism,' in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of decisionmaking according to rule.
Formalism is the way in which rules achieve their 'ruleness' precisely by doing what is supposed to be
the failing of formalism .... ").
105. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 98 (7th ed. 2007). This book is considered
the seminal text of the law and economics movement.
106. See Goodman, supra note 61 (arguing that common law efficiency is dependent on the
probability of particular litigants wining favorable decisions); Cf Nuno Garoupa & Carlos G6mez
Liguerre, The Evolution of the Common Law and Efficiency, 40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307 (2012)
(discussing the efficiency hypothesis of the common law from the perspective of comparative law and
concluding that the efficiency hypothesis of common law evolution lacks explanatory power).
107. Compare Jeffery Evans Stake, Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential
Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 401 (2005) (arguing that
inefficient common law property rules are effectively eliminated by the courts), with Ramona L. Paetzold
& Steven Willborn, The Efficiency of the Common Law Reconsidered, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157
(1991) (arguing against the tendency of the common law to evolve efficiently), and Adam J. Hirsch,
Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 425 (2005) (concluding that based upon behavioral decision theory, common law change is often
inadvertent).
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parties seek to establish a precedent result in inefficient rules being worked
out of the common law. In short, "efficient rules will be maintained, and
inefficient rules litigated until overturned." ' Priest argues that even when
parties decide not to seek or change a precedent, the common law still
evolves toward efficiency.
Professor Rubin conditions his thesis by acknowledging that
evolutionary efficiency is not uniform throughout the common law because
it is party-dependent.10 9 This insight implies that evolutionary efficiency is
not necessarily congruent with a gradual, steady evolution of the common
law. Archaic or inefficient rules that are not worked out of the law in a timely
fashion invite legislative or regulatory action. America's best private law
example is the enactment of the UCC as a reaction to the worn out Uniform
Sales Act of 1906.
Viewed through a comparativist perspective, the similarities in
commercial and contract law across legal traditions, specifically the common
and civil law, support the view that legal systems evolve in efficient ways. 110
High degrees of similarity between the systems likely reflect the fact that the
ways of doing business are similar in most legal systems so the variation in
rules should be relatively minor if law in general evolves efficiently to reflect
real world transactions. Professor Baird has offered an excellent description
of the explanatory power of an evolutionary efficiency theory of legal
development:
In addition, if evolutionary economics is correct, the law would
operate best by allowing experimentation with respect to means, even
if the law sets the ends desired and imposes certain constraints. But
the law also requires a modesty to acknowledge its own limitations
and a realization that the law is an imperfect expression that requires
careful and constant reconsideration. 1 1
1
However, divergences in rules across advanced legal traditions weigh
against the evolutionary efficiency theory. If contract rules found in the
common and civil laws are opposed, then they cannot both be equally
efficient. The emergence of different rules or divergences in the application
of similar rules may still be efficient within the context of their given legal
systems, although, efficiency theory would warrant otherwise.
From a contextual approach, it may be that different rules are efficient in
different contexts. An example would be the diametrically opposed rules,
found in the American UCC and the United Nations Convention on Contract
108. Rubin, supra note 61, at 53.
109. Id. at51.
110. For an argument in favor of the efficiency of the common law over the civil law see Rafael La
Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL.
ECON. 1113 (1998), and Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-
Side Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1551 (2003) (discussing the supply and demand conditions that affect
the creation of efficient law).
111 David McBride, General Corporation Laws: History and Economics, 74 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 18 (2011).
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for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)" 2 on the right of buyers to reject
defective goods. Section 2-601 of the UCC states that the buyer has a right
to reject goods if they "fail in any respect to conform to the contract." This
almost absolute right of a buyer to reject, even for minor defects, is
appropriately called the perfect tender rule. In contrast, the CISG
incorporates a pro-seller rule in which the buyer may only reject delivery of
goods that meet the threshold of fundamental breach." 3
Diametrically opposed rules are subject to a comparative efficiency
analysis. However, when placed in the context of domestic and international
sales, both rules can be seen as efficient. On the surface, the perfect tender
rule arms the buyer with a weapon to reject goods that closely conform to
contract requirements. This presents a moral hazard problem. Assuming the
market price for the goods declines from the time of contract execution to
the time of delivery, a buyer could use the rule as a "loophole" to get out of
the contract in order to buy lower priced goods on the market. But, in the
domestic context, such a rule is more efficient than the fundamental breach
rule. First, the duty of good faith can be used to police such bad faith acts.
Second, the disincentive of negative reputational effects dissuades merchants
from such opportunistic behavior. Third, the efficiency of domestic shipment
capabilities and the existence of secondary markets make rejection more of
an inconvenience for the seller than a major financial setback.
In contrast, the fundamental breach rule is the more efficient rule for
international sales transactions. The sending of goods to a stranger in a
distant country greatly increases the risk to the seller. The risks of theft, the
inability to find a secondary buyer, the costs of transshipping the goods, as
well as the lack of marketability of customized goods, and goods that are
subject to deterioration, make the pro-seller rule of fundamental breach the
efficient choice. The buyer is in the best position to maximize the value of
the defective goods and to prevent waste.
The next section explores non-legal theories of development to address
the nature of legal change. A model of gradual change interspersed with
radical change-legal jumps or paradigm shifts--challenges the gradualism
of change most often associated with common law development. This
modified model recognizes that gradual change is inherent in the case
method approach, while also recognizing that external shocks can result in
rapid changes in the law.
112. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 1, 1980,
S. Treaty Document Number 98-99 (1984), UN Document Number A/CONF 97/19, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CISG].
113. Id. at 8, 14-16, 19, 22.
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D. NON-LEGAL THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT
Evolutionary biology's theory of "jumps ' 114 and Thomas Kuhn's
concept of paradigm shifts" 5 offer an alternative view of common law
development. The rationale for the gradualism of common law change is that
such change provides a level of continuity, certainty, and predictability
needed for commercial transactions. Jay Gould's evolutionary jumps and
Kuhn's paradigm shifts assert that the gradualism of evolutionary change
and the incremental development of scientific theory are not true depictions
of change. In reality, gradualism is interrupted at times by dramatic change.
Gradual evolution, whether it is biological, scientific, or legal, is
intermittently shocked by profound extrinsic change. In legal development,
the impetus for radical change is an external shock to the relevancy of
existing law. The Industrial Revolution provided such a shock. New types of
contractual relations-distance selling, mass production, standard
contracting-required dramatic changes in the law. In the United States, the
evolutionary jump or paradigm shift is best represented by the enactment of
the UCC. The paradigm shift also resulted in new theories and frameworks
for looking at contract law, such as neo-classicism and relational contract
theory.
1. Evolutionary Biology
It is important to note that Ancient Law was published a year after the
publication of Darwin's The Origin of Species. Maine saw law as
evolutionary, but not always necessarily progressive. But, what Maine's
Thesis clearly had in common with Darwin's theory is that predecessor
versions of species, in the case law, remained embedded in the newer
versions. As a legal historian, Maine also believed that to understand modern
law it was vital to understand its predecessors beginning with ancient law.
Maine uses geology as an analogy: "These rudimentary ideas are to the jurist
what the primary crusts of the earth are to the geologist."' 16 Thus, for Maine,
the core theme in studying ancient law was a better understanding of the law
of his time and not the nature of legal evolution. Essentially, Maine's Ancient
Law was a work of comparative law and not a work on the evolution of law.
Herbert Hovenkamp has rightly noted that jurisprudence was
"'evolutionary long before Darwin, and it continues to be evolutionary." '117
He asserts that this is so because "[1]ike most other intellectual disciplines,
jurisprudence needs a theory of change." ' "8 Hovenkamp divides evolutionary
theories into two camps: Social Darwinists and Reform Darwinists. The
former group is made up of firm believers in natural selection and survival
114. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM 26 (2007); see infra notes 126-29 and
accompanying text.
115. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); see infra
note 140 and accompanying text.
116. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, supra note 2, at 3.
117. Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645, 645 (1985)
(citation omitted).
118. Id.
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of the fittest as applied to social evolution, where different social practices
compete against one another. Under this view, status protections interfere
with the natural selection process and, thus, Social Darwinists advocated
laissez-faire economics.' 19 In contrast, the Reform Darwinists-including
Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School-believed that people and
practices evolved from the overall cultural environment, but also believed
the environment could be created and changed.12 ° Thus, the Reformist
Darwinists saw a greater role of government associated with social
engineering. 2 ' Roscoe Pound's version of the evolutionary development of
law was called "Sociological Jurisprudence." '2 2 Sociological Jurisprudence
rejects the conceptualism of law as based upon unverifiable universal
principles and asserts that law is constructed through its interaction with
society, and is best grounded in verifiable public policy. Poundism sees law
through "a truly scientific jurisprudence [that] requires the abandonment of
individual rights claims based on natural law in favor of scientifically
determined public policy claims." '23 Pound's analysis was an attack on the
rigidity and irrationality of the legal formalism of the time-use of deduction
from general principles, such as 'liberty of contract,' which were often
obsolete, empty vessels that failed to respond to changing times and the
nuance of social reality.'24 The failure of Pound's theory of legal
development was its inability to determine the public policies that best
served the different social classes found in society. "' While Pound's view of
119. Id. at 648.
120. Id. at 654.
121. Id. at656.
122. Pound coined the term "sociological jurisprudence" for his philosophy of law that focused on
the interrelationship in law and society-social activities' impact on substantive law and law's ability of
law to effect change in society (social engineering). See Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological
Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911) & 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1912); see also James A. Gardner,
The Sociological Jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound, 7 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1961) (explaining Pound's
sociological jurisprudence as a positive theory of the sociology of law based on twin premises-
application of social sciences to understand the role of law in society and the use of law as an instrument
of social control). Pound's philosophy of law can be seen as a precursor to legal realism because he
recognized that the law had become out of sync with social developments. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some
Realism About Realism: Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222, 1235 (1931) (describing
both the similarities and differences among social jurisprudes); G. Edward White, From Sociological
Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58
VA. L. REV. 999 (1972) (describing the displacement of sociological jurisprudence by Realism).
123. Hovenkamp, supra note 117, at 678 (citing Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of
Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591, 604 11 (1911); Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a
Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339, 346 (1905); Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological
Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907)).
124. Pound was one of the first to attack the legal formalism, which Pound pejoratively called
"mechanical jurisprudence," that existed at the turn of the twentieth century. He asserted numerous
principles of law had become empty vessels that courts applied to cases often blind to the facts:
"Manifestations of mechanical jurisprudence are conspicuous in the decisions as to liberty of contract. A
characteristic one is the rigorous logical deduction from predetermined conceptions in disregard of and
often in the teeth of the actual facts .... Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 462
(1908-1909).
125. Hovenkamp, supra note 117, at 679.
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law as a tool for social engineering proved implausible, he was able to open
legal formalism to the critique subsequently advanced by the legal realists.
The traditional historiography of common law development is one
marked by a law that took centuries to mature through gradual change. 126
This may have been true during the Middle Ages and through to the
eighteenth century, but it has not been true of the modem era of legal
development. Alternatively stated, in a relatively static period of social
change, the change in law is also relatively static. However, dynamic or
epochal change in society requires major changes in the law. The debate of
whether the law is always in the lag position or whether law can initiate
dramatic social-economic change is a sociological-legal question not a part
of the current undertaking. The issue being explored here is the rate of legal
change. The most rational model would combine the case-by-case
gradualism of common law with intermittent paradigm shifts or legal
"jumps." The evolutionary theory associated with Stephen Jay Gould
provides an appropriate analogy. 27 Under the concept of "punctuated
equilibrium," evolution is characterized by long periods of little change,
where a species is gradually transformed into another, with relatively short
periods punctuated by rapid, cladogenesis or species-splitting change.2 8
Richard Dawkins labeled Gould's work with Niles Eldredge as "discrete
variable speedism" in which gradual change is interspersed with
evolutionary jumps. 129
The application of punctuated equilibrium to legal development has
recently been provided in the area of administrative law development.
Professor Niles references Eldredge-Gould in stating that: "evolution is
much more often the product of dramatic quantum shifts over relatively short
periods of time, than the kind of gradualism envisioned by Darwin." 30 Niles
asserts that the evolution of regulations follows a similar path. Examples
include: the Sarbanes-Oxley Act'3' in response to a series of corporate
126. See SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (6th ed. 1820).
The nature of the common law is to accommodate "the Conditions, Exigencies, and Conveniences of the
People ... as those Exigencies and Conveniences do insensibly grow upon the People, so many Times
there grows insensibly a Variation of Laws, especially in a long Tract of 7me." Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
127. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 775 (2002).
128. Niles Eldredge & Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic
Gradualism, in MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY 82 (1992) (critiquing Darwinian theory that evolution is
characterized by slow and steady transformations of new species; instead, breaks in the fossil records
indicate that new species arise through rapid and sudden changes). Eldredge and Gould assert: "The
history of evolution is not one of stately unfolding, but a story of homeostatic equilibria, disturbed only
'rarely' (i.e., rather often in the fullness of time) by rapid and episodic events of speciation." Id. at 84; see
also NILES ELDREDGE, TIME FRAMES, at 193-223 (1985); STEPHEN JAY GOULD, PUNCTUATED
EQUILIBRIUM 26 (2007); GOULD, supra note 114 ("sudden jumps"); Ernst Mayr, Change of Genetic
Environment and Evolution, in J. HUXLEY, A. C. HARDY & E. B. FORD, EVOLUTION AS A PROCESS 157-
180 (1954).
129. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER 227, 245 (1996).
130. Mark C. Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model for Administrative Evolution, 44 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 353, 353 (2011) [hereinafter Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium].
131. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Star. 745 (July 20, 2002) (set new or expanded
requirements for all U.S. public company boards of directors, management, and public accounting firms).
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scandals, including the collapse of Enron, and the Dodd-Frank Act'32
following the 2008 financial crisis. These dramatic regulatory responses
were premised by the view that the existing legal structures were incapable
of preventing a reoccurrence.' 33 These regulatory jumps are rare in a political
process where political interest groups are generally successful in preventing
rapid regulatory changes. Thus, a dramatic social-economic event is the
means by which agency capture by interest groups are evaded to effectuate
a substantial change in law. While economic crises and business cycles have
long focused on regulatory jumps, Niles notes that this view of change is
even more relevant in the information age, where even less dramatic events
can have powerful societal impacts and resulting regulatory shifts.134 In this
environment, the occurrences of rapid regulatory change become much less
rare.
Another example of a legal jump occurred in the area of contract
interpretation with the movement from formalist to contextualist
methodologies. The legal formalist believes in an internally logical, enclosed
body of law, that can be directly applied in each case. This conceptual utopia
is founded on another belief that every issue presented in real world cases
has a pre-existing, ready-made solution in the law. This may be true in "easy
cases," but it is not true in novel or "hard cases." The idea that courts should
refrain from using extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of a contract or in
the application of contract law is, at best, in American common law,
superficially acknowledged. In fact, some form of contextual evidence is
used even in the so-called easy cases as well. Karl Llewellyn was a strong
believer in the dynamic nature of commercial law. This dynamism is due to
the grassroots-nature of commercial and contract law creation. 135 In this way,
the conceptual edifice of commercial law could be constantly refreshed by
real world developments. The template for a law that is in a constant state of
recreating itself was the courts willingness to consider contextual evidence.
Thus, the law of practice-trade usage, commercial practice, and business
custom-would enter and change the law through case decisions. This
constant renewal of law prevents the anachronism of non-changing or slowly
changing law that characterized the abstract conceptualism associated with
the legal formalism that existed in the early twentieth century.
Llewellyn, in writing Articles 1 and 2 of the UCC, rejected the status-
quo contextualism that sociologist William Graham Sumner 3 6 and attorney
132. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (July 21, 2010) (made substantial changes to financial regulations that affected all federal financial
regulatory agencies and most parts of the financial services industry).
133. Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium, supra note 130, at 421.
134. Id.
135. Llewellyn argued that since society and commerce where changing rapidly so too must the
law: "The conception of society in flux, and in flux typically faster than the law, so that the probability is
always given that any portion of the law needs reexamination to determine how far it fits the society it
purports to serve." KARL. N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 55
(1962) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE].
136. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF
USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS (1906).
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James Coolidge Carter 13 7 advanced in the early part of the twentieth
century.138 The Sumner-Carter model of legal change was simply the
recognition and continuation of ancient customs. Under this model of
change, context-driven change is slowed by the need to tie all legal change
to evolving, but historically ancient, customs. Sumner-Carter's theory of
change was not the dynamic change that Llewellyn attempted to incorporate
into the UCC through his repeated use of the reasonableness standard.
Reasonableness determinations are inherently contextual endeavors. In
contrast, Sumner-Carter contextualism was diachronic in nature, in that a
rule adjustment had to fit within a historical context of customary common
law. It is an evolutionary gradualism more akin to Darwinian-Spencerian
theory of evolutionary change. 13 9
For Llewellyn, Isaacs, and the other Realists, legal development or
change---especially in commercial law-was an inductive process with a
forward-looking perspective. Where Sumner-Carter looked backward to
ancient customs anchored by relatively static societal norms; the realist
looked to existing commercial practice to constantly adjust rules to fit the
present and looked to the consequences of such rule adjustments for future
cases. While Sumner-Carter's view of change was reconcilable to the
deductive reasoning of legal formalism; the realists argued that the deductive
process had to be complimented with inductive reasoning from facts and
practice to prevent rules from becoming anachronistic.
2. Paradigm Shifts: Kuhnian Theory
American legal historian Alan Watson recognized the notion of a
paradigm shift in his concept of "legal revolution.""14 Unlike a social
revolution, the legal tradition remains, but the basis of the law changes. The
idea of "paradigm shifts" is most popularly associated with the work of
Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn, in his influential book, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, argues that a paradigm shift is when the basic assumptions
within mainstream scientific theory are replaced.14 1 From an evolutionary
perspective, paradigm shifts in scientific thinking are similar to evolutionary
jumps in evolutionary biology, in which scientific advancement is not
137. See generally JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, LAW, ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION (1907).
138. Llewellyn characterized Sumner-Carter's view of common law change as "wooden,
externalized, graceless, and cumbersome maladaptation." KARL N. LLEWELLYN & ADAM HOEBEL, THE
CHEYENNE WAY 288 (1941).
139. See SPENCER, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 29; see also HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS,
OR THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIALTO HAPPINESS SPECIFIED (1851) (although a work ofpolitical philosophy
advocating libertarianism; often associated with Social Darwinian; Spencer coined the term survival of
the fittest often associated with Darwin). Spencer concludes that:
[W]e are to search out with a genuine humility the rules ordained for us-are to do
unfalteringly, without speculating as to consequences, whatsoever these require; and we are
to do this in the belief that then, when there is perfect sincerity-when each man is true to
himself-when every one strives to realize what he thinks the highest rectitude--then must
all things prosper.
Id. at 518.
140. WATSON, supra note 88, at 118.
141. KUHN, supra note 115.
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characterized by a slow moving linear progression, but is accelerated by
paradigm shifts that lead to new ways of scientific thinking.
Just as Patrick Glenn noted the incommensurability in comparing legal
traditions, Kuhn argues that competing scientific paradigms are also
incommensurable. As a result, the competing views of contract law cannot
be reconciled, and our view of contract law can never be a purely objective
one. In fact, the incommensurability issues of law are much greater than
those in scientific evolution. Science is a pure fact-based undertaking. Once
a new theory is scientifically proven there is no avenue to go back and argue
the truth of the older, disproved theory. Law, as a value-laden creation, is
able to re-cycle theories of law, legal development, and legal reasoning. It is
this distinction between science and law that lends credence to a cycle theory
of legal development.
In Kuhnian terms, divergences between reality and law or legal theory
lead to the development of a new paradigm. In contract, rules are changed
and new standards asserted to close the gap. The paradox is that the
revolution is not based on a sudden dramatic insight or event, but is based
upon a steady build-up of changes in reality, and law's response or lack of
response to those changes. As Llewellyn and Isaacs recognized in the 1920s,
piecemeal changes in the commercial law of the time was no longer a rational
course of action. The gap between business reality and existing rules
necessitated a more sweeping change in commercial law. This recognition
led to a change in Llewellyn's mandate from revising the Uniform Sales Act
of 1906 to the drafting of a broad commercial code. 
42
142. William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1,2 (1967) (the various uniform acts prepared, and subsequently
adopted by various states by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL), beginning with the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act of 1896, had been independent efforts
drafted by different parties resulting in inconsistencies between the different acts; also certain provisions
in the acts were "no longer suitable to govern the business practices of the day"). By 1940 the Revised
Sales Act had been drafted. At the same time the NCCUSL approached the American Law Institute to act
as a co-sponsor of the Sales Act, but by 1944 the two organization agreed to move forward to drafting a
general commercial code. William Schnader, the then-President of NCCUSL, explained why Karl
Llewellyn was chosen as the Chief Reporter for the UCC Project:
There was no difficulty in finding a "Chief Reporter." The outstanding man in the United
States to undertake this task was Professor Karl N. Llewellyn .... Not only was Professor
Llewellyn a student of commercial law as it appeared in the law books, but he was the type of
law professor who was never satisfied unless he knew exactly how commercial transactions
were carried on in the market place. He insisted that the provisions of the Code should be
drafted from the standpoint of what actually takes place from day to day in the commercial
world rather than from the standpoint of what appeared in statutes and decisions.
Id. at 4. Llewellyn represented to the legal academy and practitioners a unique blend of theory and
praxis. See also Karl N. Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 558 (1940); Karl N.
Llewellyn, Why WeNeedthe Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367 (1957); Homer Kripke,
The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L. F. 321 (1962).
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III. CASE STUDY: JEWISH LEGAL EVOLUTION
Isaacs, in studying the tension between tradition and innovation in
Jewish Law, saw legal change as anchored in basic principles. Therefore, the
cyclical nature of legal development is a reflection of this tension. Isaacs was
both "fascinated by universal legal ideals" and his belief that Jewish law was
a living, growing law.'43 The cyclical nature of legal development was not a
chaotic one because it was guided by the application of basic principles to
novel developments in society. Furthermore, Isaacs did not see the Jewish
people or their law as sui generis.' 44 Jewish scholar Norman Solomon notes
that Jewish law was practiced within different societies, cultures, and
religious or secular legal systems:
Talmud is very much a product of the interaction between biblical
tradition and the Mediterranean and Near-Eastern cultures of late
antiquity . . . The extent to which Jewish law was influenced by
Roman, Greek or Near Eastern legal systems and social mores is much
debated. Some concepts, such as guardianship, have no biblical
precedent, leading the rabbis to use Greek terms . . . . In general,
talmudic halakhah in matters of civil and criminal law must be read in
the context of other legal systems of late antiquity. It has its distinctive
features, deriving mainly from the attempt to harmonize the biblical
text with actual practice, but at the same time [it] shares much with the
surrounding societies.' 45
Isaacs's knowledge of the Jewish and civil law legal systems enabled
him to place Anglo-American law in a broader context. 4 6 Isaacs believed
that the indexing of the responsa and the legal experience in the Jewish
settlement in Palestine could add "a new chapter . . . to the influence of
Judaism on Western Law."' 14 7 Isaacs accepted that there were rigid periods in
Jewish law, but he asserted that these periods were followed by flexible
periods of equity. 48 Crucially, he argued that these cycles occurred in all
legal systems.149
H. Patrick Glenn has noted that the impact of sources outside of the
common law are often forgotten or ignored: "More distant traditions have
143. See Adolph S. Oko and Nathan Isaacs, Correspondence Between A Jurist and a Bookman, IV
MENORAH J. 73, 73-85 (1918) (calling for the writing of a history of Jewish Law).
144. Nathan lsaacs, Jewish Law in the Modern World, 6 MENORAH J. 258, 262 (1920).
145. Norman Solomon, Making Talmud Intelligible, in REPORT OF THE OXFORD CENTRE FOR
HEBREW & JEWISH STUDIES: 2008-2009 79-81 (2009), available at https://ochjs.eyedivision.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/Ann-Report-rev.-2008-09.pdf.
146. See Weisbrod, Way We Live, supra note 89, at 786-87 nn.40-44 (analysis of the general
character of Nathan lsaacs's writings and career).
147. Nathan lsaacs, The Influence of Judaism on Western Law: A Gift Inter Vivos, in THE LEGACY
OF ISRAEL 377, 403 (Edwyn R. Bevan & Charles Singer eds., 1927).
148. See Isaacs, Law of Change, supra note 3, at 58-59 (theory of legal development in Jewish law
and secular law in a two-part article).
149. Nathan Isaacs, Is Judaism Legalistic?, 7 THE MENORAH J. 259, 266 (1921) (Isaacs's
description of cycles in Jewish Law).
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also contributed greatly to one another, as with the Talmudic and Islamic
contributions to the common law . " ,1"0 The responsa tradition is the
counterpart of the common law's precedent and case-based system of
reasoning. Largely based on analogical reasoning, a new case is processed
through a search for applicable law. This search involves the analysis of
previously decided, similarly situated cases. Analogical reasoning may be
both deductive and inductive in nature. The search for similarly situated
cases or fact patterns is inductive in nature (search for similar fact scenarios),
while the recognition and application of the relevant law or rule is deductive
(application of law's conceptualization-principles, standards, rules) in
nature. The reasoning process entails the extension of existing case law or
the analysis when applied to the case at hand may suggest a rule adjustment
or the creation of a new rule, such as an exception. As in the common law,
Jewish responsa exhibits both dimensions of analogical reasoning 1 '
A. THE PREMISE AND ITS EXPLANATORY POWER
Isaacs's cycle theory as applied to Jewish law was premised on the idea
of the existence of cycles between tradition and innovation. An alternative
way of viewing cycle theory in Jewish law is his belief in universal principles
while also recognizing the changing content of law. The cycle approach may
be seen as the way the bet din'12 restores harmony between contesting
parties, which at times involve novel fact situations not expressly dealt with
by the Talmud. '53 The degree of influence of Jewish law on the development
of the common law can be debated.'54 But, thousands of years of the Jewish
legal tradition predate the common law and likely had some influence on
common law development.'55 Some argue that Jewish law remains a source
of common law development: "American courts and legal scholars have
increasingly turned to Jewish legal tradition for insights into various issues
confronting the American legal system."' 56 This should not come as a
150. H. Patrick Glenn, Are Legal Traditions Incommensurable?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 133, 140
(2001) [hereinafter Glenn, Incommensurable?].
151. "[C]ase-based reasoning and explicit, principle-based conceptualization are closely, even
inextricably, intertwined in rabbinic literature .... LEIB MOSCOVITZ, TALMUDIC REASONING: FROM
CASUISTICS TO CONCEPTUALIZATION 272 (Mohr Siebeck: Tilbingen 2002).
152. Bet din or beit din is a Rabbinic Court, which built up the Jewish legal system during Biblical
times and to the present acts as a court for litigation between Jews, most importantly in the area of divorce,
and to provide instruction as to the meaning of Jewish law (halakhah).
153. The Talmud is an enormous compilation of teachings consisting of sixty-three tractates totally
523 chapters. It was compiled over a period of about eight hundred years. Talmud means study and refers
to the massive collection of law produced by rabbinic Judaism from the oral traditions.
154. See Rabinowitz, The Influence of Jewish Law on the Development of the Common Law, in L.
FINKELSTEIN, THE JEWS: THEIR HISTORY, CULTURE AND RELIGION 823 (3rd. ed., vol. 1 1960).
155. See Daniel G. Ashbum, Appealing to a Higher Authority?: Jewish Law in American Judicial
Opinions, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 295 (1994) (reviews American case law for express citations to
Jewish law).
156. See Samuel J. Levine, An Introduction to Self-Incrimination in Jewish Law, with Application
to the American Legal System: A Psychological and Philosophical Analysis, 28 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 257,258 (2006) [hereinafter Levine, Self-Incrimination]; see also Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit
of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106
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surprise, since Jewish law (halakhah) is not only a spiritual conduit to the
Jewish faith, it touches upon all aspects of life, including everyday
activities. 5 7 Alternatively stated, there are a surpnsmg amount of similarities
between Talmudic law and modern secular law.158
B. JEWISH LEGAL INNOVATIONS
This analysis does not significantly take into account the pluralism of the
Jewish legal tradition. Like the history of all legal traditions, the historical
record is never monochromatic: "Today there is a growing recognition of the
variety in Jewish belief and practice, together with a deeper appreciation of
the contributions that the different schools have made to the content of
Jewish life and thought."' 59 Isaacs saw Jewish law as dynamic in nature and
not ending with the passing of the law to Moses at Mount Sinai. Alternatively
stated, he did not believe the literal revelation of the five books of the Torah
was in complete form at Mount Sinai. 6 ° While applying cycle theory to
secular legal systems, Isaacs also used it as a response to the Jewish Reform
movement at the turn of the twentieth century. He believed in the importance
of authority and fixed basic principles espoused in Orthodoxy. But, he also
saw Jewish law as dynamic in responding to real world developments and in
the application of those basic principles. Even though he was strict in his
practice of the rituals of the Jewish faith, he did not approve of the
unbending, static nature of some views of Orthodoxy. At the same time,
despite his view of the flexibility of Jewish law, he rejected the Reform
style's complete rejection of the authority of the rabbinic tradition.
Thus, the development of Jewish law, like any other legal system, was
heavily influenced by customs external to the literal text of the Torah: "The
power of the popular will, as distinct from the official Halakhah, is
exemplified in the famous dictum 'Custom sets the law aside."""' Custom
was resorted to when there were competing interpretations among scholars
of the meaning of the law and "when a set of exceptional circumstances
prevailed."' 62 The binary relationship between a given society and law is
made obvious from the variations of Jewish law after the Diaspora resulted
in the emigration of Jews throughout Europe and Northern Africa: "The
many differences in local background and experiences, coupled with the
beliefs and desires of the common people, produced the phenomenon of
minhag, 'custom,' as distinct from din, 'law.' These minhagim reflected
HARV. LAW REV. 813 (1993); Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional
Theory: Some Comparisons and Contrasts, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441 (1997).
157. Halakhah refers to the entire corpus of Jewish law.
158. See, e.g., Jed W. Jurkowitz, Talmudic and American Tort Liability--A Comparative Analysis,
10 ARIZ. L. REV. 473 (1968) (analyzing the similarities between Talmudic law and common law in the
areas of negligence, strict liability, and the measurement of damages for personal injuries).
159. ROBERT GORDIS, THE DYNAMICS OF JUDAISM: A STUDY IN JEWISH LAW 30 (1990)
[hereinafter GORDIS, DYNAMICS OF JUDAISM].
160. Conversation with Samuel Flaks (July 12, 2011).
161. GORDIS, DYNAMICS OF JUDAISM, supra note 159, at 105.
162. Id.
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every conceivable level of content and outlook and were marked by
considerable power and persistence."
16 3
Even though much of the minhagim disappeared, mainly because they
were out of touch with the times, between the Medieval and Modem Age,
the importance of evolving custom and its influence on Jewish law has
persisted:
The emergence of new practices and institutions embodying the
operation of ethical principles under changing conditions was not an
unbroken linear process .... [However,] the general direction was
unmistakable. A new position once achieved was rarely abandoned; on
the contrary, it proved the point of departure for another step forward
toward the realization of the ideal.
164
Another example of the dynamic nature of Jewish law is seen in the
recognition of prenuptial contracts. In this recognition, we see the dynamic
nature of the Halakhah. Because of the rarity of divorce in ancient times the
issue of providing support for an ex-wife was not one of urgency. In the case
of divorce, tradition required the divorcing husband to provide a sum of
money or a "get." As the incidents of divorce increased, and the injustice of
divorcing husbands not providing a get, the prenuptial agreement providing
for the wife in case of divorce came to be recognized as an enforceable
obligation. 16
5
C. JEWISH COMMON LAW
Isaacs's major insight was to recognize that Jewish law is a dynamic,
living law, responsive to moral and ethical concerns, much as he stressed the
same attributes in American law. He argued that Jewish life "was developing
the Halakah by applying it.' 16 6 An example was the development of the
practice known as hazakah, which developed in response to the scarcity of
housing due to anti-Semitism and, at times, the segregation of the Jewish
population. In order to prohibit Jews from competing for the same rental
units Rabbis, sometimes, but not always, with reference to the Talmud,
recognized the tenant-right or hazakah. This tenant-right prohibited one Jew
from attempting to rent a unit currently occupied by another Jew.' 67 The
result was an early form of rent control. Isaacs's research on rent control in
Jewish law was cited as precedent for the constitutionality of rent control in
163. Id. at 106.
164. Id at 121.
165. "[New] agreements, including the Agreement for Mutual Respect, have been built and
developed on the foundations laid by the rabbis of Morocco in the 1950's." Rachel Levmore, Rabbinic
Responses in Favor of PrenuptialAgreements, 42 TRADITION 29, 44 (2009). Such agreements have been
approved "by various rabbinical authorities, including ... the Supreme Rabbinical Court of Jerusalem."
Id. at 42.
166. Samuel Flaks, Harvard Law School Legal History Colloquium (April 25, 2008) (quoting a
Letter from Henry Hurwitz to Adolph S. Oko (January 12, 1921), ASO Articles, MS 14, AJA, File 2, Box
8; see also Nathan Isaacs, Jewish Law in the Modern World, 6 THE MENORAH J. 258, 262 (1920).
167. lsaacs, Influence of Judaism, supra note 84, at 402.
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oral arguments before Judge Cardozo's New York Court of Appeals and the
U.S. Supreme Court, where both courts upheld New York's groundbreaking
rent control law.168
D. JEWISH LAW OF CONTRACTS
One scholar asserts "that many of our common law principles and many
of the legal forms and customs which we find difficult to explain, trace their
origin more or less directly to sources in the Written and Oral Law of the
Jewish people."'' 69 One example is found in the law of contracts. The
evolution of form (formalities, such as offer-acceptance, seal, and the Statute
of Frauds) and the doctrine of consideration are found in Jewish law: the
"Jewish counterpart of the fixed form in Anglo-American law is Kinyan."'"
"The delivery by A to B of the article of use creates an obligation [(Mahaeb)]
in B to deliver the money to A. This is the identical concept of contracts
which prevailed in England in Glanville's time."''
The creation of an executory obligation, or current promise for a future
transfer or payment, is an example of the creativity and innovation of Jewish
law. Multiple types of obligations (debt, barter, obtaining ownership by
form) were combined to create the modem day law of contract "in the
creation of the concept of Hiyub. This was accomplished by combining parts
of the applicable and functional principles of the doctrines of Areb [(surety)],
Uditha debt), Kinyan [(form)] and Deikni [(lien)]."' 72 Jewish law also
requires consideration to bind most contracts. However, unlike modem
common law, Jewish law concerned itself with the adequacy of the
consideration. Thus, if something was sold or bought for an amount higher
or lower than one-sixth of its market value, then the agreement was void.
Jewish law is similar to the common law on the rule that a detriment can be
consideration and that past consideration could not bind a contract. The
common law rule against penalties was predated by the Jewish principle of
Asmakhta. "[It] is a rule which declares to be invalid an assurance made by
one that he will pay or forfeit something in the event of his non-fulfillment
of a certain condition, which, however, he is confident that he will carry
out."
173
The conceptualistic nature of rabbinic legal opinions in the area of
contract 174 allows for a comparative analysis with the common law of
contracts. This comparison, not surprisingly, shows a great amount of
similarity. In early Jewish law, as in the early common law, formality was of
great importance. However, the key roles of intent or consent, alongside the
168. See Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. Inc. v. Siegal, 230 N.Y. 634 (1921); 810 West End Avenue v.
Stem, 230 N.Y. 652 (1920), Edgar Levy Leasing Co. v. Segal, 258 U.S. 242 (1922).
169. Charles Auerbach, The Talmud-A Gateway to the Common Law, 3 W. RES. L. REV. 5, 8
(1951).
170. Id. at 10.
171. Id. at ll.
172. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 19.
174. Moscovrrz, supra note 151, at 27.
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required formalities, are fully actualized from the early stages of Jewish legal
development:
No matter how perfectly formalized a transaction may be, it will not
be valid unless that form is supported by knowledge, intention, and
consent-by Da'at. Conversely, Da'at without form cannot normally
have any legal effect.75
The act of a person who does not know what he is doing has no legal
validity. 17
6
[I]n mercantile law, the rule is... [that] [aIll formal acts of acquisition
require the intention of the acquirer to acquire and the disponer to
dispose .... An act without intention is worthless ....
The second major element of common law contracts is the requirement
of consideration. The same concept is found in Jewish law as a requirement
for a binding contract. However, today, consideration in the common law is
viewed primarily as a formality.78 In contrast, relative equality of the
consideration is required in Talmudic law. Despite these seemingly different
approaches to consideration, a broader view allows for an understanding of
the difference. First, Ona'ah (inequality of consideration or inequity in the
exchange) was an early regulatory device in Jewish law to police fraud and
overreaching. Profiting from a transaction is assumed under Jewish law, but
something that rises to the level of unconscionability would be invalidated.
Viewed as such, the Ona'ah can be seen as an early version of
unconscionability that was first found in common law equity and later
adopted in American law through Section 2-302 of the UCC, and by analogy
to the general law of contracts. Historically, the focus on the fairness of the
exchange was a core concept in the common law as late as the nineteenth
century.
179
175. ARNOLD COHEN, JEWISH CIVIL LAW 228 (Feldheim Publishers: Jerusalem 1991).
176. Id. at 229. Examples of this include Jewish law's adoption of the three major areas of
incapacity which are also found in the common law: (I) intoxication, but only extreme intoxication (a
contract with "someone who is drunk would be valid unless he had reached the stage of Lot's
drunkenness," (2) mental incapacity, and (3) infancy law doctrine ("Neither a madman nor a minor is
deemed to know what he is doing and is therefore deprived of legal capacity .. "). Id. (citations omitted).
177. Id. at 233 (citations omitted).
178. Arthur Gross Schaefer, Differing Concepts ofAdequate Consideration from Common Law and
Talmudic Law: De Minimis Versus Equity, 2 NAT'L JEWISH L. REV. 79 (1987) [hereinafter Schaefer,
Differing Concepts]; see also Fuller, Consideration and Form, supra note 56, at 799 (seminal article
discussing the transformation of the doctrine of consideration from a substantive law doctrine to a
requirement of form).
179. See Gordley, supra note 54; see also LARRY A. DiMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(2001) (tracing the equitable side of contract law from the twelfth century forward).
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IV. STATUS AND CONTRACT
Patrick Atiyah made the case for the need for status-based protections in
contract law. He lays the rationale on the tenuous nature of free choice. Those
that are the beneficiaries of good fortune, such as intellect, wealth, and the
best available education, are better equipped to take advantage of free
contracting: "[T]he greater is the scope for the exercise of free choice, the
stronger is the tendency for these original inequalities to perpetuate
themselves by maintaining or even increasing economic inequalities."8 0 The
Coase Theorem's argument that such inequities do not prevent entitlements
arriving in the hands of those who can maximize its value rings hollow in the
face of reality.181 In reality, the disparity between the wealthy and the poor
continues to grow at an alarming rate. The assumption of no or low
transaction costs that allow entitlements to flow to the most efficient user
bears little relationship to reality. In fact, the inequality of transactional costs
also continues to grow between the haves and have not's. Often times
contracting parties do not play on a level playing field. Transactional costs
asymmetries flow from the baseline inequities alluded to by Atiyah. Status-
based protections will grow in importance as the protector of last resort
against these growing inequities. This Part will examine in more detail the
relationship between status and contract.
A. STATUS-BASED RELATIONSHIPS
A good example of the oscillation between status and contract is the
employment contract. A look back at the last 500 years in Anglo-American
law shows that the employment relationship has largely been recycling
between the status and contract poles of Maine's dichotomy. The 1562
English Statute of Laborers 8 2 created a status-based relationship that
provided protections to apprentices. It required advanced notice and a
reasonable cause for a legal termination.183 A further protection provided by
the Statute was the presumption that a hiring with no fixed term was an
employment contract of one-year. In nineteenth century America, there was
a paradigm shift that resulted in the recognition of the employment-at-will
doctrine. The watershed event being the publication of Horace Wood's 1887
treatise on the Law of Master and Servant, in which Wood states:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so
much a day, week, month or year, no time being specified, is an
indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day
180. PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 6 (1979).
181. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (assuming no
transaction costs, the initial allocation of property is immaterial because the property will eventually end
up in the hands of the most efficient user).
182. Statute of Labourers, 1562 5 Eliz. 1, c.4 (Eng.).
183. IRA MICHAEL SHEPARD, PAUL HEYLMAN & ROBERT L. DUSTON, WITHOUT JUST CAUSE: AN
EMPLOYER'S PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE ON WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 16 (1989).
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even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may
serve. 1
84
The importance of Wood's Treatise is reflected in the fact that there were
only a handful of cases that recognized employment-at-will at the time.'
8 5
The real source of Wood's declaration was not found in the law, but was a
response to the Industrial Revolution and its need for a flexible, fungible
workforce. The rejection of the special status of employees was evident in
the United States Supreme Court decisions in the early twentieth century,
holding that even minimal employee protections were unconstitutional under
the Constitution's Contract Clause. 86 In the 1915 case of Coppage v. Kansas,
the Court declared that "the employer and the employee have equality of
right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary
interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally
justify. 1 87 In that case, the Court upheld an employer right to prohibit its
employees from joining a union as a condition of employment. Even though
the Supreme Court's position changed in the mid-1930s to allow workplace
protections, such as maximum hour and child labor laws, the employment-
at-will doctrine remained the default rule for the employment relationship.
Toward the end of the twentieth century, the pendulum began to swing
back toward status-based protections. First, all of the American states
adopted a public policy exception to at-will termination. This exception
holds that an employer may not discharge an employee, without liability, if
the discharge was due to an employee act that was in furtherance of a public
policy. Thus, discharging an employee who is absent from work in order to
serve on a jury would be illegal under the public policy exception. Broader
184. HORACE GAY WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 283 (1877).
185. See J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 335 (1974).
186. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1: "No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts .... During the Lochner Era, 1897 to 1937, the Supreme Court used the Contract Clause
to invalidate numerous state laws regulating the work place. The era is named after the case of Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the Supreme Court held that a New York labor law that limited
the work day in bakeries to ten hours was an unconstitutional violation of the freedom of contract
embedded in the Contract Clause and applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment
(substantive) due process provision. This is seen as an example of legal formalism and the core belief in
laissez-faire economics:
According to progressive scholars, American judges steeped in laissez-faire economic theory,
who identified with the nation's capitalist class and harbored contempt for any effort to
redistribute wealth or otherwise meddle with the private marketplace, acted on their own
economic and political biases to strike down legislation that threatened to burden corporations
or disturb the existing economic hierarchy. In order to mask this fit of legally unjustified,
intellectually dishonest judicial activism, the progressive interpretation runs, judges invented
novel economic "rights"-most notably "substantive due process" and "liberty of contract"
that they engrafted upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Matthew J. Lindsay, In Search of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, " 123 HARV. L. REV. 55, 55-56
(2010).
187. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I, 11 (1915) (upholding "yellow dog contracts," which allowed
employers to prohibit employees from joining unions).
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exceptions-implied-in-fact contract and breach of the duty of good faith-
began to be recognized in some states. 88 Even though at the present these
exceptions have not been uniformly adopted, their existence in some states
potentially changes the at-will default to a just cause legal regime.
The implied-in-fact exception liberally construes employment-related
materials (company policies, employee handbooks) and employer
representations--even when the employer expressly states it is an at-will
relationship---to find an implied-in-fact contract for just cause termination.
The good faith exception is potentially the most expansive of the exceptions
since it applies to all employment relationships. The basis of this exception
is Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which states:
"[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement."' 8 9 Under this exception, the
motivation for discharging the employee becomes tantamount in determining
the legality of the discharge.9' Thus, in an otherwise at-will relationship, if
an employer discharges an employee to prevent full vesting of the employee
in the company's pension plan, then that would constitute bad faith
termination.
B. STANDARD FORM CONTRACTING
It was in Isaacs's Standardizing of Contracts article that the term
"standard" was first applied to contracts."'9 He saw the rise of standard form
contracting as challenging classical contract law's unitary consent-based
view of contract law.19' Professor Weisbrod more recently argued that
Standardizing of Contracts demonstrated the malleability of the consent
principle: "All relationships can also be seen through the law of contracts-
some more comfortably than others. By bending and twisting the idea of
choice, most relationships can be understood as chosen, even if the choice is
188. See Philip H. Dorff, Jr. & Hugh J. Cain, The Evolution of the Implied Contract Exception to
the Employment-At- Will Doctrine in Iowa: From Young to French and Beyond, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 359
(1994).
189. It should be noted that the Restatement drew from the provisions of the UCC relating to the
duty of good faith and fair dealing (citing UCC §§ 1-202(19) (meaning of good faith); 2-103(l)(b) (for
merchants, good faith means "honesty in fact" and "observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing"); 2-306(3) (duty of best efforts)).
190. See Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment Context, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1233 (1992); Clyde W. Summers,
Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65
(2000).
191. Professor Snell traces scholarly concern for adhesion contracts to the work of tsaacs: "[Isaacs
argued] that contract law should promote 'freedom in the positive sense of presence of opportunity' and
that the law should strive toward 'standardizing... the relations in which society has an interest, in order
to remove them from the control of the accident of power in individual bargaining."' G. Richard Shell,
Federal Versus State Law in the Interpretation of Contracts Containing Arbitration Clauses: Reflections
on Mastrobuono, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 43, n.109 (1996) (citing lsaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts,
supra note 32, at 47).
192. See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 77-79 (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas
A. Reed eds., 1993) 77-79 (excerpting The Standardizing Contracts of Contracts as an example of a
realist analysis that highlighted the conflict between the will theory of contract and early twentieth century
legal developments).
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the refusal of an association." '193 Instead of simply creating fictitious models
of consent to justify standard contracting as within the unitary theory, Isaacs
saw the need for the development of specialized rules to regulate such
contracts. The will theory's view of contract, as a pure exercise of freedom,
did not fit the imposition of standard terms by the stronger contracting party
on a take it or leave it basis.
Isaacs charged that because of a lack of true consent by the form-
receiving party, especially when that party is a consumer, required a new
categorization of those types of contracts with their own status-oriented set
of contract rules (consumer contract law).194 He believed, like any principle
or right, the exercise of such principles and rights could not be unfettered.
There would always be a need for limitations, regulations, and exceptions.
For Isaacs, the standard form contract was the line in the sand in need of a
separate categorization, with applicable restrictions and regulatory limits on
enforceability. Standard form contract terms represented a "practical check
on the individuality of contracts, if not a theoretical limitation on the freedom
of contract."'95 Despite the obvious diminishment of the quality of consent
in standard form contracts, judges and scholars largely folded these types of
contracts into the classical framework. Contract theory has failed to properly
adjust by continuing to rationalize the enforcement of such contracts through
the rubric of unitary contract principles of consent. Nonetheless, Isaacs's
prophecy that status would make a major comeback' 96 in order to regulate
such contracts was realized. Instead of adjusting contract law internally,
except for the expansion of the doctrine of unconscionability in American
law, the protections came from external sources through the enactment of
consumer protection laws. It should be noted that Llewellyn was able to
create status-oriented rules through the use of the merchant-consumer
distinction and the adoption of the doctrine of unconscionability in the
UCC. 19 7
193. Weisbrod, Way We Live, supra note 89, at 807 (citation omitted).
194. In a section entitled, "Social Enfranchisement Through Status Law," Isaacs asserts that the
law was moving from the era of laissez-faire toward status to provide protections to consumers and
workers: "Yet, freedom in the positive sense of presence of opportunity is being served by social
interference with contract." Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, supra note 32, at 47.
195. Id. at 39.
196. Id. at 40.
197. Llewellyn at first wanted to have separate merchant rules in Article 32 of the UCC and the
creation of specialized merchant courts. Both proposals were rejected, but he was able to incorporate the
merchant-consumer distinction in some of the rules in Article 2. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The
Limits of ision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987) (analyzing
Llewellyn's view of merchant rules as expressed in the early 1940s drafts of Article 2). Some of the
merchant rules found in Article 2 provided additional protections to consumers, such as Section 2-207,
but mostly the merchant rules, such as the written confirmation rule, were installed to facilitate
commercial transaction. See R.B. Herrington & H.M. Durham, Merchant Provisions in the Uniform
Commercial Code-Sales, 39 GEO. L.J. 130 (1950) ("distinction drawn between merchant and non-
merchant or more broadly speaking between the skilled and unskilled").
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Isaacs recognized that the concept of freedom was a multi-dimensional
concept that included positive and negative freedom.' 98 Superior bargaining
power can lead to a form of negative freedom where the weaker party's
manifestation of consent is really an exercise of negative freedom. The
negative nature of the consent is a creature of the weaker party's belief that
there is a lack of an alternative. The one-sidedness created by the use of
superior bargaining power dictates judicial or regulatory intervention to
reorder relationships initially created by contract in order to protect the
weaker party against overreaching. 199 Again, cycle theory can be brought to
bear to expunge the concept that contract law is purely private law. Instead,
cycle theory shows that contract law cycles between its private autonomy
(private law) and regulatory (public law) functions.
C. PROBLEM OF ANACHRONISTIC RULES
The cyclical progression of legal development is implied in Cotterrell's
"battle of ideologies." 2" Competing ideologies (such as freedom of contract
versus justice in the exchange) seek to determine the rules and doctrines that
reflect the given ideology. But, this is a perpetual battle in which winners and
losers constantly change positions. Cotterrell notes that "[1]egal history
shows the discovery, loss and rediscovery of specific ideas and techniques
over time." '' This implies circularity of legal techniques and styles of legal
reasoning. Part of this is due to societal developments that at times suggest
the utility of a given type of legal thought and doctrine. A simple notion of
progression asserts that the law changes in response to changes in economic
and social change. Cotterrell again notes that the interrelationship between
society and law is not perfectly correlated. He states that "[i]t is extremely
difficult to pick out clear lineal patterns of development of legal techniques
so as to be able to relate them confidently and exactly to the existence or
non-existence of particular forms of economic or social relationships.., and
kinds of transactions at specific moments in history."2 2 Thus, different
schools of thought or ideologies will always exist at a given time and to a
certain degree.
V. FALSE DICHOTOMIES OF LEGAL REASONING
The voluminous literature espousing different unitary theories of
contract law-such as promise, reliance, consent and efficiency-has only
198. Philip Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 90 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1519, 1520 n.30 (2003) (citing lsaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, supra note 32,
at 47).
199. lsaacs gave the example of the insurance contract in which overreaching by the insurance
industry lead to government intervention. NATHAN ISAACS, THE LAW IN BUSINESS PROBLEMS 217 (The
Macmillan Company rev. ed. 1934); see also Carol Weisbrod, War Insurance and Some Problems of
Community, 10 CoNN. INS. L.J. 103, 111-13 (2003-2004).
200. COTERRELL, LIVING LAW, supra note 31, at 170.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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proven the nonsensical nature of such a quest.203 A cyclical theory of legal
development recognizes that law has always and will always oscillate
between different poles of a multi-dimensional matrix. This oscillation in
contract law is due to the dynamic and complex nature of real world
transactions. Contract law is dynamic and complex because of "the rich
complexity of actual situations that involve full-dimensional people. 2 °4
Thus, contract law's theories and dichotomies possess explanatory power
when taken as a whole. In the end, unitary theories fail to fully explain the is
or ought of contract law. Dichotomies are inherently false due to the
dynamic-complex range of contract transactions. The explanatory power of
dichotomies, however, can be harnessed through the recognition that they
form a continuum in which the law gravitates, over time, toward one pole or
the other. This recognition is the essence of cycle theory.
A. DYNAMIC NATURE OF LAW
The richness of the law and oral traditions of Jewish law can be attributed
to the nature of the Torah: "Because the laws of the Torah were enunciatory
in nature and required a great deal of interpretation by the rabbis, a large
body of oral interpretive teachings developed."205 J. David Bleich rejects the
abstract conceptualism of legal formalism and the idea of an absolute and
static Jewish law: "Law is not metaphysics; nor is the Halakhah"2 °6 The
Jewish responsa, or Jewish common law, supports the premise that Jewish
law is a dynamic, living law. The comparison of Jewish law and the common
law is not a novel idea. The idea that both laws are dynamic in nature is
commonsensical. Steven Nadel states that the "[c]omparison of the talmudic
law's regulation of the market place with that of the Anglo-American legal
system can enhance our understanding of law as a dynamic system of
thought." 207 One commentator, in reviewing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Co.,2 8 traces the foreseeability standard needed to prove proximate cause in
tort to Jewish law. 2 9 He notes that throughout the commentary on the Talmud
a person could not be held liable in negligence for an unforeseeable
occurrence. The Talmud recognizes Gerama, which holds that a tortfeasor is
not liable for remote, unforeseeable damages. 210 Nadel states that this use of
203. See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the "Law of
Satisfaction" A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349 (1995) [hereinafter DiMatteo, Norms of
Contract] (arguing that contract law is best explained as a normative composite representative of most of
the proposed unified theories of contract law).
204. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF
LAW 6 (2007).
205. Jurkowitz, supra note 158, at 473.
206. J. David Bleich, The Metaphysics of Property Interests in Jewish Law, 43 TRADITION 49, 67
(2010).
207. Schaefer, Differing Concepts, supra note 178, at 80.
208. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).
209. Steven B. Nadel, Palsgraf Revisited: A Comparative Analysis of the Unforeseeable Damages
Exception to Liability Under American and Jewish Tort Law, 5 NAT'L JEWISH L. REV. 145 (1990).
210. Id. at 151.
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Gerama is an example of Jewish judicial courts "expanding the application
of the Torah-based principles" to novel cases.2 11
Sociology of law and legal history have demonstrated that the dynamism
of societal development requires a dynamic, albeit lagging, development in
law. But, the changes in the law are not always knee-jerk responses to socio-
economic change. For example, contract law is ever changing to meet the
needs of changes in society, but it also helps guide real world transactions.
The law not only responds to new categories of novel fact-situations, but it
also helps anchor transactions with certainty and predictability. Roger
Cotterrell notes, "if we are to treat seriously the hypothesis that law has an
independent effectivity, the coercive power of the law must be treated
primarily as the power of a political authority guaranteeing the law and, at
the same time, directing and channeling its power through legal doctrine. '"212
At the same time, it is clear to see in legal history, especially in the past two
centuries, contract law responding and changing to real world developments,
such as distance selling, form contracting, inequality of bargaining power,
evolution of the leasing and licensing of products and intellectual property,
Internet contracting, creation of franchising, and the liberalization of
international trade.
B. COMPLEXITY OF CONTRACT LAW
The reason for the oscillation between status and contract and between
the dominance of certain types of legal reasoning during different eras of
legal development is that contract law is responsive to different values. The
list of contract values includes private autonomy, certainty, fairness, and
justice, among others. A more static, less dynamic, contract law would need
to evaluate and reconcile these competing values into a normative composite.
This is impossible due to the incommensurability of values. Patrick Glenn in
comparing legal traditions notes that "[m]onistic theories are those which
presuppose a single, ultimate value in the world against which all must be
measured." '21 3 No single value, whether autonomy or fairness, can fully
capture contract law. This ensures that even in freedom of contract and legal
formalist eras, there remains a good measure of contract law whose primary
normative base is fairness concerns and some level of contextualism within
the legal-formalistic infrastructure. Glenn notes, however, that within a given
legal tradition the incommensurability of values is contained within a socio-
political framework. This framework allows the legal system to function
despite the incommensurability problem. The possible outcomes of the
competing values "would all nest within the range of permissible choices
which western life offers to US." '2 14
The complexity of contract law can be simplified by viewing the norms
that underlie its principles and rules as a tree with a number of sturdy
branches. Or, in the alternative, the American notion of the "spoke and
211. Id. at 145.
212. COTTERRELL, LIvING LAW, supra note 31, at 169.
213. Glenn, Incommensurable?, supra note 150, at 137.
214. Id. at 138.
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wheel" approach to commercial law in which common law contracts make
up the core or center and the spokes represent different sets of specialized
bodies of rules for specific transaction types; such as sales of goods, leasing
of goods, licensing of goods, and so forth.215 This approach to revising
Article 2 of the UCC was rejected, but its general theme remains-that the
complexity of contract law requires categorization and attendant specialized
rules. The tree analogy would have the trunk of contract law being the core
norms of freedom of contract, certainty, and predictability. These norms
attach to all forms of contract. Ancillary norms such as fairness, justice, trust,
expediency, and security, apply to varying degrees depending on the
transaction or contract-types, such as promissory notes, consumer sales,
letters of credit, licensing of intellectual property, and so forth.
A close look at different areas of contract law shows different ancillary
principles at work besides the core norms. In sales law, an expediency
principle underlies most of the law. The focus is not so much on performance
or breach; the focus is on quick contracting and delivery of goods. The rules
focus not so much on the parties, but on the goods themselves. More
specifically, sales law's ancillary goal, beyond facilitating private autonomy,
is the prevention of waste and the quick acquisition of substituted goods if
needed. This is why we see the perfect tender rule in the American UCC and
the fundamental breach rule in the CISG. Perfect tender allows for an
expedient rejection of goods by the buyer. Due to market fungibility and an
efficient domestic transport system, the buyer can quickly cover and the
seller can quickly find a secondary buyer to transship the goods. In this way,
the buyer's harm is partially mitigated, the cost to the seller is diminished,
and the value of the defective goods is not lost. The CISG, with its pro-seller
rule, accomplishes the same objective due to the different context of the
international sale of goods transaction. Market fungibility and the low costs
of transshipment are greatly diminished. The party that is best positioned to
minimize the waste and harm caused by the delivery of defective goods is
the buyer. Thus, the fundamental breach rule places the onus on the buyer to
use or resell the defective goods. Both sales laws minimize waste by placing
duties on the buyer to protect and preserve the defective goods.
In the area of government contracts, the ancillary principles of
transparency and opportunity of access are what makes this body of law
different than the general common law of contracts. With the common law
of contracts as a backdrop, government bid regulations aim to provide access
to government procurement contracts to a broader range of private
contractors. The principle of transparency allows for greater access to
procurement information for interested parties. Secondly, at the same time,
government contract law's intended goal is to increase the opportunity of
access to smaller and medium-sized firms. This goal is rationalized under the
215. See Marion W. Benfield, Jr. & Peter A. Alces, Reinventing the Wheel, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1405 (1994) (explaining the hub and spoke concept of contract law or commercial law as a hub of
general principles that apply to all contracts and spokes of specialized rules for specific types of contracts
or contract types).
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principle of equality. Sometimes this goal is made explicit with policies that
give minority group companies preferential treatment. Other times, the goal
of equality is implicit in the bidding process, such as when larger
procurements are broken into numerous, smaller invitations to bid, to allow
smaller and minority-owned firms the opportunity to bid.
In the area of letters of credit, bank guarantees, suretyship, and
performance bonds, the core certainty principle is the dominant contract
norm. There is no ancillary principle per se, but there is the presence of
ancillary parties. The assurance of payment or performance is external to the
primary contract. In a sense, the uncertainty of payment or performance by
a contracting party is resolved through the enlistment of a trusted third party.
Because of this external source of certainty, a principle of integrity underlies
the transaction. This principle relates to the integrity of the guaranteeing
institution in honoring its obligations and the integrity of the contracting
party, which is signaled by its ability to obtain such a guarantee.
In the area of employment law and the limited liability company, the core
principle of freedom of contract is almost uncontested. However, agency,
fiduciary, and good faith principles place a check on that freedom. The
American employment-at-will model holds that, outside of a written
employment contract or a collective bargaining agreement, an employer may
discharge an employee without notice for any or no reason. Even in this
bastion of American liberalism, ancillary principles have begun to impact the
law. As noted above, some states have carved out exceptions to the at-will
rule. The implied-in-fact exception holds that, even though an employment
relationship begins at-will, the employee may obtain just cause termination
rights. The case of a loyal, long-term worker with firm specific skills is one
where the principles of loyalty and heightened duties seem more
pronounced. A second exception-implied-in-law or good faith exception-
protects at-will employees from bad faith termination. The rationale here is
quite simple-the duty of good faith is or should be implied in all contracts.
This is an example where the UCC has transformed the general law of
contracts by analogical applications. The duty of good faith and fair dealing
found in the UCC is now implied in non-UCC cases including: termination
of franchises, employment, mortgage loan and foreclosures, landlord-tenant
contracts, and so forth.
A long-term or relational contract's primary norm is the preservation of
the contract and the contractual relationship.2 ' Given the sunk costs and
specialization of goods or services linked to such contracts, the need for
flexibility becomes paramount in obtaining a return on investment, and the
harm caused by the premature ending of a contract by a technical breach
enforced by the terminating party. Additionally, in most such contracts, due
to their long-term and often personal nature, the formal, written contract will
fade or get lost in the context of the relationship. Within this relational-
216. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract
Law, 72 NW U. L. REV. 854 (1978); Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 691 (1974).
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preserving context the ancillary principles of good faith, trust, and loyalty
play important secondary influences on how the law is applied.
It is the complexity of contracts that lays the basis for a number of widely
discussed dichotomies that will be discussed in the next Section. Due to the
variety of transaction-types, there is no general, overarching structure or
meaning. It would seem that such complexity would argue for a contextual-
interpretive methodology. Contextual evidence is needed to appropriate
meaning from the matrix of particular parties, particular industries, and
particular transaction-types. Others have offered a diametrically opposed
proposition: due to contract law's complexity, legal formalism is the means
to bring order to the chaos by processing such complexity through a unitary
premise that contracts are consent-based." 7 Under such an approach, the
parties have the responsibility to negotiate out of formalism, which involves
the recognition of standardized terms and the formal application of contract
rules. The next Section reviews some of contract law's theoretical
dichotomies-formalism-realism, textualism-contextualism, and standards-
rules.
C. DEBATES AND DICHOTOMIES
Numerous dichotomies have been used to characterize law and legal
reasoning. These dichotomies include the appropriateness of rules versus
standards and the relative qualities of legal formalism versus contextualism.
In the end, cycle theory shows that these are pseudo-dichotomies. It provides
an explanation that scholars have always known, that the eras of legal
development all incorporated relative amounts of both ends of the
dichotomies. During the high-water mark of laissez-faire economics of
nineteenth century America, there, was an extraordinary amount of state and
local government regulation of private transactions.218 The move from legal
formalism, beginning in the 1920s to the present, to a more realistic,
contextual jurisprudence, was far from a total success. Formality remains,
and should remain, a part of our contract law system.219 On the other hand,
contract law is not a formalistic machine whose formal rules provide single
right answers. But, formal rules do provide a certain level of certainty and
predictability.
1. Formalism-Realism
The debate between formalism and realism is actually two debates. At
the risk of confusion, this Article deals with these separately. The first debate
217. See Chamy, Hypothetical Bargains, supra note 20, at 1849.
218. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (arguing that the characterization of nineteenth-century America is a myth;
showing the existence of the pervasive use of government regulation; documenting nineteenth century
ordinances, statutes, and common law restrictions that regulated every aspect of the marketplace).
219. See Fuller, Consideration and Form, supra note 56 (arguing that formalities, such as the
Statute of Frauds and, in Lon Fuller's view, the consideration requirement, serve to caution contracting
parties that they were incurring binding obligations; in areas such as negotiable instruments, formalities
provide the trust and security required for that area of law).
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is whether it is possible to have a closed, internally logical system that
provides answers to all cases through deduction from law to case
(formalism). Realism represents a number of tenets in legal thought. First,
rule skepticism holds that rules really don't decide cases; other factors decide
cases, such as a judge's predisposition and the operative facts of the case.
Second, because rules cannot resolve hard cases, contract law is largely
indeterminate. This skeptical view argues that a judge usually reaches a
decision first and then looks to the law to rationalize the decision. In sum,
the meaning of formalism here is the formalistic application of rules, and
realism, its radical tenets aside, is the recognition that other elements
influence the judicial decision whether economic, policy considerations, or
the creative nature of a given judge in crafting new law.
The second debate, reviewed in the next section, involves the methods
of interpreting contracts and contract law. The question here is what sources
of evidence are permitted in the interpretation of a contract and the
application of contract rules to that contract? Formalists hold to classical
contract law's premise that places the written contract intended as a final
integration of the parties' agreement, as the only relevant source of evidence.
The exceptions are cases of contractual incompleteness and contractual
ambiguity. If there is a gap in the contract, then the court may apply a default
rule. In the case of ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is used to determine the
most plausible meaning-party intent or trade usage. Contextualists argue
that meaning can never be completely found within the four-corners of the
written contract.22° The premise here is that words may mean different things
in different contexts. Therefore, the written contract is just one piece of
probative evidence, along with evidence extrinsic to the formal contract. In
the next section I refer to the second aspect of formalism as textualism, and
will more fully explore its counterpoise of contextualism.
Hanoch Dagan provides a succinct description of the formalist-realist
divide: "Formalists . . . describe 'the standard judicial function as the
impartial application of determinate existing rules of law in the settlement of
disputes.""' While realists "reject the idea that law is or can be 'a self-
regulating system of concepts and rules, a machine that, in run-of-the-mill
cases, simply runs itself.' 12' The realists reject the thesis that law can be
made determinate by simply equating law with doctrine. Instead they see law
as 'a going institution,' 3 and thus focus their attention on the dynamics of
legal evolution, notably adjudication. ' '224
220. See Justice Traynor's analysis in the Pacific Gas case, infra notes 235 36 and accompanying
text.
221. Hanoch Dagan, Between Rationality and Benevolence: The Happy Ambivalence of Law and
Legal Theory 62 ALA. L. REV. 191, 196 (2011) [hereinafter Dagan, Rationality] (citing H.L.A. Hart,
American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, I 1 GA. L. REV.
969, 971 (1977)); see also Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 611-
17 (2007); H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream, 11 GA. L. REv. 969, 971 (1977).
222. Dagan, Rationality, supra note 22 1, at 196 (citing Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of
Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 611-17 (2007)).
223. Karl N. Llewellyn, My Philosophy ofLaw, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 183 (1941).
224. Dagan, Rationality, supra note 221, at 196.
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A more interesting issue is whether parties can contract into formalism
by setting the rules of interpretation in their contract. Professors Schwartz
and Scott have answered the question in the affirmative, at least, when it
comes to business-to-business transactions. 225  They argue that
businesspersons primarily want certainty and that certainty requires the use
of formalism in the interpretation of such contracts. They posit that firm-to-
firm contracting is "conditioned on few states of the world, and maximizes
joint gains in a wide variety of contexts., 226 They argue the power of
contextual evidence to uncover meaning is unnecessary in business contracts
since the bargaining parties are willing to trade off a rare misinterpretation
for the certainty of formalistic interpretation. There is no evidence that
suggests that business contracts should be treated as a separate species in
need of different rules of interpretation. First, not all businesspersons are as
sophisticated or possess equality of bargaining power that the Schwartz-
Scott thesis assumes. Second, their model assumes, wrongfully I suggest,
that business contracts and their meaning are immune from contextual
influences. Another commentator rightfully suggests, even if business parties
intend to adopt a formalistic interpretation, that it would still "take a
contextual . . . approach to determining whether formalist principles
apply."227  The better theory to explain the relationships between
businesspersons is relational contract theory, which is contextual in nature.228
Another commentator, instead of using relational contract theory to
critique formalism, argues in the alternative that many business transactions
are short-term in nature and that the argument for formalism in interpretation
of those contracts is most inappropriate:
This is because the usual arguments for formalist interpretation
struggle to explain why formalism complements parties' choice ....
In their traditional formulations, the standard arguments for
formalism-that formalism creates incentives for parties to draft
clearer agreements (standardization theory) and that formalism allows
informal governance to flourish (self-enforcement theory)-appear
insufficient. Standardization theory fails because the endemic
uncertainty that attends innovative activity precludes parties from
creating standardized contractual terms that a court can readily
recognize. Traditional self-enforcement theory fails because . . .
interfirm collaborations are often neither lengthy nor repeated .... 2 2 9
225. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 60, at 544-48.
226. Id. at 618.
227. Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. L.
REV. 493, 536 (2010).
228. See Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
877, 881 (2000) (outlining core propositions of relational contract theory).
229. Matthew C. Jennejohn, Contract Adjudication in a Collaborative Economy, 5 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 173, 210 (2010).
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It is in the fact patterns of real world cases-whether in Jewish responsa
or in the common law, in which the limits of formalism are exposed.
Plausible arguments can be made that a strictly formalist argument is
unsound in both discrete and long-term business contracts. There is no
empirical evidence to support the Schwartz-Scott's assumption that
businesspersons prefer formalistic interpretation of their contracts instead of
interpretations based on their true intentions through the use of contextual
evidence.
2. Textualism-Contextualism
The first dimension of formalism discussed above relates to the
formalistic (purely deductive) application of existing law under the premise
that existing doctrine provides answers to all issues brought before the
courts. Furthermore, the application process is a mechanical one that leaves
little room for judicial discretion. In contrast legal realism asserts that
material external to the law-novel fact patterns, public policy
considerations, distributive justice concerns-also have a strong impact on
judicial decision-making. These materials are used in the application of legal
rules through the process of induction. This section analyzes the impact of
these views on the process of interpretation of contracts.
At the core of the debate between the textual (literal) and contextual
interpretive methodologies, is the recognition of evidentiary rules.
Formalism's mechanical-deductive model suggests that the interpretation
process should be limited to the written contract. The parol evidence rule
bars the introduction of extrinsic evidence that contradicts the written form,
but allows extrinsic evidence in cases of gaps and ambiguity. Contextualism
recognizes that only through the admission of extrinsic evidence can the true
intentions of the contracting parties be uncovered. The formal-literal
interpretive approach that characterized American law in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries also appeared in eras of Jewish law: "Rabbinic
explanations of legal rulings . . . are frequently formalistic and
conceptualistic in nature. Such explanations often focus on the formal legal
status of particular actions or objects ... rather than on the assumed goals of
the law (e.g., promoting equity)."23 At other times, Jewish law continues to
absorb external customary practices. These intermittent eras of formalism
and equity in Jewish law are what inspired Isaacs's fabrication of cycle
theory.
Cycle theory explains the swing between textualism versus
contextualism over time with the contract pole aligning with formalism and
status related to contextualism, which allows for the characteristics of the
parties to be considered in the interpretation and enforcement of contracts.
That said, these general doctrinal trends are partially created not only by
societal forces, but also in the competing styles of legal reasoning or
techniques of legal interpretation.
230. MOSCOVITZ, supra note 151, at 27.
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According to contextualists, the court itself, using informal business
norms as a guide, should proactively fill the agreement's gap on behalf
of the parties. On the other hand, modem formalists argue that a court
asked to enforce an incomplete contract should follow a minimalist
understanding of its role and refuse to extrapolate the contract's
indefinite language to reach the unforeseen situation. Such an
approach addresses incompleteness by creating incentives for parties
to draft clearer agreements and/or because informal governance will
compensate for the courts' minimized role.231
As noted previously, cycle theory falsifies contract law's dichotomies in
that at all times contract interpretation is a blend of formalist and
contextualist approaches. Alternatively stated, there are different shades of
contextualism, just as there are less strict forms of formalism. In order to
flesh out what contextualism means in the actual interpretation of cases, I
will review three iconic cases-two American cases and one English case-
that demonstrate the implications of contextualism. The cases are in
chronological order Pacific Gas v. G.W. Thomas Drayage Co. (Pacific
Gas),23 Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co. (Nanakuli),233 and
Investors Compensation Scheme (ICS) Ltd. v. West Bromwich Building
Society (ICS v. Bromwich).234 All three cases illustrate the late twentieth
century's trend towards contextual interpretation of contracts.
In Pacific Gas, California Supreme Court Chief Justice Richard Traynor
rejected a plain meaning approach dictated by legal formalism. The relevant
clause in the case was an indemnity clause in which one party agreed to
indemnify the other for "all" damages to property "arising out or in any way
connected" to the performance of the contract. The indemnifying party
argued that the words "all" and "any way" related only to damages to
property of third parties. A plain meaning approach would hold that "any"
meant "any" and that "any way" meant damages caused to anyone's
property. The lower court held that since the indemnity clause had a plain
meaning it could not admit any extrinsic evidence that would contradict its
interpretation.
Traynor famously rejected the lower court's argument by asserting that
such a rule "would limit the determination of the meaning of a written
instrument to its four-comers merely because it seems to the court to be clear
and unambiguous, would either deny the relevance of the intention of the
parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our language
has not attained." '235 Traynor's assertion pretends that the plain meaning rule
was a novel creation by the lower court judge instead of a longstanding
common law rule. Knowing this, Traynor acknowledges the parol evidence
231. Jennejohn, supra note 229, at 176-77 (footnote omitted).
232. Pacific Gas v. G.W. Thomas Drayage Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
233. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981).
234. Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich Building Soc'y [1998] 1 WLR 896
(Eng.).
235. Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d at 644.
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rule, which prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to contradict a written,
integrated contract. He then empties the rule of its prohibitory authority by
stating: "Although extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, detract
from, or vary the terms of a written contract, these terms must first be
determined before it can be decided whether or not extrinsic evidence is
being offered for a prohibited purpose. 2 36 In essence, it is rarely the case
where a word or phrase has a plain meaning. Therefore, even when the
language is seemingly clear, extrinsic evidence should be considered to
determine whether the language is susceptible to an alternative interpretation
to the plain meaning interpretation.
The Nanakuli case demonstrates how far contextualism can reach. In that
case, the court surmises that: "courts should not stand in the way of new
commercial practices and usages by insisting on maintaining the narrow and
inflexible old rules of interpretation."'23 7 Unlike Pacific Gas, where there was
at least a plausible argument for ambiguity, the issue in Nanakuli is a step
into the abyss of linguistic nihilism. The case involved a long-term supply
contract for the supply of asphalt paving materials. The contract expressly
provided the supplier could unilaterally change the price without notice. The
clause stated that the price shall be the supplier's "posted price at [the time
of] delivery." '238 Despite the clarity of the meaning, admitted to by the court,
the court allowed the jury to consider extrinsic evidence. However, instead
of overtly doing away with the ordering of evidence (parol evidence rule) as
Justice Traynor did, the court went on a quixotic journey to work within the
formal rules of contract interpretation. The extrinsic evidence of note was
general business customs to price protect buyers in long-term supply
contracts. Price protection would require some advance notice or
maintaining the price for jobs already contracted or bid on by the buyer using
the price at the time of contracting. However, the court did not instruct the
jury that the custom could trump the clear language of the contract but,
instead allowed it to construe the custom or trade usage as being consistent
with the contradictory plain meaning of the express term!
Finally, the House of Lords, more recently, made the case for
contextualism in ICS v. Bromwich.239 The comparison of the majority and
dissenting opinions provides a stark example of formalistic and contextual
methods of interpretation. The dissent provides the case for a legal
formalistic interpretation. The interpretive issue in the case was the meaning
of a reservation of rights phrase in an assignment clause. The reservation
stated that the assigning party reserved "any claim (whether sounding in
rescission for undue influence or otherwise)."24 Lord Lloyd makes the
distinction between language that is "tolerably clear" and language that is a
product of poor drafting. In the event that the language is tolerably clear the
problem of poor drafting is not the subject for which a court is to use extrinsic
evidence to uncover the parties' true intent. He rejects the importance of the
236. Id. at 645.
237. Nanakuli, 664 F.2d at 790 (emphasis added).
238. Id.
239. Investors Compensation Scheme, 1 WLR 896.
240. Id.
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oddity of specifying undue influence and not the other common grounds for
rescission. Lord Lloyd acknowledges the use of purposive interpretation
methodology, but rejects its use here since the plain meaning of the clause
can be ascertained. He disregards the phrase, "or otherwise," and asserts that
the placement of the phrase in question in parentheses can only be construed
as a narrowing of the external phrase, "any claim."24
Lord Hoffman, writing for the majority, works within the same rules of
interpretation advanced by Lord Lloyd and, at the same time, breaks out of
the structure of the formal rules of interpretation. First, he argues that Lord
Lloyd's interpretation of the parentheses is a misreading. The key phrase is
"any claim," while the parenthetical phrase serves only an illustrative
purpose and is not a limitation of the types of claims permitted under the
reservation of rights. Second, assuming that Lord Lloyd's interpretation is a
reasonable one does not mean that there are no other reasonable
interpretations that would be uncovered through a closer contextual analysis.
In contrast, Lord Hoffman provocatively states that: "The meaning which a
document... would convey to a reasonable man is not the same thing as the
meaning of its words." '24 2 This is a clear rejection of legal formalism and the
241. Id.
242. Lord Hoffman sketches five principles of contract interpretation:
(1) Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a
reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been
available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.
(2) The background [has been] ... referred ... as the "matrix of fact," but this phrase is, if
anything, an understated description of what the background may include. Subject to the
requirement that it should have been reasonably available to the parties and to the exception
to be mentioned next, it includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in
which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man.
(3) The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of the parties
and their declarations of subjective intent. They are admissible only in an action for
rectification. The law makes this distinction for reasons of practical policy and, in this respect
only, legal interpretation differs from the way we would interpret utterances in ordinary life.
The boundaries of this exception are in some respects unclear...
(4) The meaning which a document ... would convey to a reasonable man is not the same
thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and
grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the
relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean. The background may
not merely enable the reasonable man to choose between the possible meanings of words
which are ambiguous but even ... to conclude that the parties must, for whatever reason, have
used the wrong words or syntax.
(5) The "rule" that words should be given their "natural and ordinary meaning" reflects the
common sense proposition that we do not easily accept that people have made linguistic
mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On the other hand, if one would nevertheless
conclude from the background that something must have gone wrong with the language, the
law does not require judges to attribute to the parties an intention, which they plainly could
not have had.
Id. (citations omitted).
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interpretive rules of classical contract law-four-corner analysis, plain
meaning rule, and a hard parol evidence rule.
Lord Hoffman's conviction that reasonable meaning is or should not be
the determinate of actual meaning, although Hoffman's approach is not a
complete rejection of the objective theory of contract, it is a partial rejection
of the reasonable person analysis when it is confined to the words of the text.
The fact that a plain meaning interpretation is possible is important probative
evidence, but should not shunt the judicial inquiry of whether there is an
alternative reasonable meaning through the consideration of the contextual
evidence. The alternative objective meaning places inter-subjective meaning
in the trump position over the plain meaning interpretation since it shows
that the other party knew or should have been aware of the first party's
alternative meaning or intent. Meaning is an inter-subjective enterprise. An
example of this model or ordering of intent is found in Article 8 of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).
It states that the first order rule is the subjective meeting of one party "where
the other party knew or could not have been unaware" of what that party's
"intent was." 243 This assessment cannot be determined without an analysis
of all relevant contextual evidence.244 The second order rule is the reasonable
person or objective theory of interpretation. If the search of the evidence fails
to uncover the inter-subjective meaning, then the meaning attributed by the
reasonable person prevails. 245
Lord Hoffman's rejection of plain meaning interpretation, and embrace
of inter-subj ectivism, is made clear when he quotes Lord Diplock in Antaios
Compania Naviera SA v. Salen Rederierna AB246: that "if detailed semantic
and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead
to a conclusion that flouts business commonsense, it must be made to yield
to business commonsense. 247 In essence, even in cases of ambiguity, the
meaning given by a reasonable person ought not to automatically prevail.
This does not seem at all controversial since formalism allows for the use of
extrinsic evidence in cases of ambiguity. However, Lord Hoffman goes on to
say that a reasonable person determination (plain meaning plus extrinsic
evidence) should not necessarily prevail when the extrinsic evidence fails to
remove the ambiguity. In fact, the court is required to choose "between
competing unnatural meanings" when the evidence shows that the parties did
not intend to use the words in an ordinary manner.
Justice Traynor and Lord Hoffman's rejection of literalism were not
some Cardozo-like leap of faith. Instead, they were openly recognizing what
had previously been a covert operation. The ambiguity determination is a
243. CISG, supra note 112, at 3.
244. Contextualism is fully embraced in CISG Article 8 (3): "due consideration is to be given to all
relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties have
established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties." This rejection of
interpretive formalism is re-enforced in Article I I's provision that a contract "may be proved by any
means, including witnesses." Id. at 4.
245. Id. at 3.
246. Antaios Compania Naviera SA v. Salen Rederierna AB [1985] AC 191 (Eng.).
247. Id. at 201.
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decision of law and, as was seen in Nanakuli, where even the clearest of
language can be dubbed an ambiguity when the true meaning is likely to be
found in the arena of contextual evidence. In the end, contextualism in some
degree has been a part of contract interpretation from the very beginning.
Without it, laws dynamic nature would be greatly diminished and the
divergence of law and commercial practice would soon render contract rules
obsolete.248 It is the recognition of context- from large socio-economic
change to the creation of new transaction types-that law progresses.
As noted earlier, both sides of contract law's dichotomies, as discussed
in the scholarly literature, appear throughout the recent history of the
common law in some degree. Such balancing or blending that a continuum
approach represents is demonstrated by the notion of "relational formalism."
Relational contract theory sees many business contracts embedded in a
relational framework, which requires the recognition of other than the purely
freedom of contract norms of certainty and predictability and include trust,
loyalty, solidarity, and the duty to renegotiate.2 49 This expansion of contract
norms suggests that, even in long-term contracts, formalism continues to
play a role, but that the relational context is important in determining the
nature and intended meanings of the parties to such contracts. Formalism
suggests that parties, especially business parties, should have the onus to
craft contracts that can be applied strictly under legal formalism. Relational
formalism suggests that, even in highly formalized contracts, such as
financial instruments, context still plays an important role. It holds that strict
formalism may have a pragmatic use in some types of contracts, but it can
never be completely detached from the context of relationships.'
3. Rules-Standards Debate
Cycle theory lends insight to the rules-standards debate. 25 1 The debate
discusses the differences between rules and standards, as well as what each
248. Max Radin noted that in 1920 the California sales law was still based upon a 1848 codification
(Field Code) and was hopelessly out of touch with commercial reality: "Now 1848 is a long time ago,
and in industrial and commercial communities the needs of business [persons] have demanded a very
thorough revision of the common law of sales-a law, which we may remember, grew up in an
atmosphere of fairs and markets, quite uncomplicated by the elaborate machinery of modem credit and
finance." Max Radin, The Law of Sales in California and the Uniform Sales Act, 9 CALIF. L. REV. 27, 27
(1920).
249. MACNEIL, supra note 216.
250. See Jonathan Yovel, Relational Formalism and the Construction of Financial Instruments, 48
AM. Bus. L.J. 371 (2011). Yovel explains the concept of relational formalism as follows:
[A]lthough maintaining the precedence of fonnalist construction over functional analysis and
policy considerations-does so while responding to practical concerns and interests entailed
by the relations between the relevant parties and, in particular, reliance relations. Legal
formalism thus needs not be a manifestation of positivistic commitments, but can be justified
in some areas on relational and functional grounds.
Id. at 371 72 (citation omitted).
251. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58
(1992) ("Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective
value choices to be worked out elsewhere."); see also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
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is best suited. Should standards remain the key component of tort law? Are
rules best utilized in areas such as contract law and government regulation?
Cycle theory suggests that areas of law cycle between rules-based and
standards-based legal regimes. Of course, most areas of law possess both
standards and rules. However, over time, standards through application to
various categories of cases are recast into rules-based regimes. At times, a
chaotic rules-based jurisprudence leads to a more simplified regime with the
adoption of standards to compliment the codification of new rules. One
commentator provides an example relating to the statute of limitations.252 At
the turn of the twentieth century, the standard of laches provided an equity-
based approach that granted courts discretion in determining whether a cause
of action had become stale. Laches was marginalized as States adopted fixed
periods to bring timely claims under limitation statutes. As in all fixed-rule
systems, the bright line periods caused injustices in certain categories of
cases. The courts and legislatures responded by extending limitation periods
through the principle of tolling. However, tolling resulted in the extension of
limitation periods well past a reasonable time. This resulted in the passage
of statutes of repose to fix the length of time that tolling can extend the right
to sue.
The defining characteristic of a rule is that it can be applied by making
a simple factual determination. However, Russell Korobkin notes that a hard
and fast rule can lose its clarity by its hardness being diluted through the
recognition of exceptions and ultimately lead to the adoption of a standard
to remove the jurisprudential chaos of rules, exceptions to rules, and
exceptions to exceptions.25 3 In time, in order to prevent injustice in certain
categories of cases, exceptions are crafted onto standards. As the number of
exceptions increase, the original standard is contorted into a series of precise
rules. The process continues as rules become more standard-like through the
creation of exceptions. This cyclical process of rules-standards-rules is
explained by cycle theory.25 4 When standards become too obtuse, courts see
the need for more formalism and break the standard into fixed rules. When
rules lag behind societal developments and become anachronistic, courts
look to the development of a flexible standard in order to better cohere the
law with real world practice.
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (discussing economic analysis of the efficiency of rules
versus standards).
252. Huhn, Stages of Legal Reasoning, supra note 93, at 376-77.
253. Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79
OR. L. REV. 23, 25 (2000) ("Rules establish legal boundaries based on the presence or absence of well-
specified triggering facts.").
254. See Huhn, Stages of Legal Reasoning, supra note 93, at 380:
[A]s rules evolve into standards, and as standards evolve into rules, a critical stage in the
process is judicial experience in applying the law. For standards to become rules, the courts
must draw formalist analogies between cases interpreting the standards, and for rules to
become standards, the courts must draw realist analogies among the cases interpreting the
rules. This pattern in the evolution of rules and standards supports the concept that formalism,
analogy and realism are the stages of legal reasoning, and that analogy serves as the bridge
between formalism and realism.
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Another discernible characterization of the cyclical nature of common
law reasoning is the role of equity within contract law. 255 Judicial discretion
is expanded during eras of equity. Isaacs asserted that during periods of
growth by equity, there is a great deal of discretion by judges." 6 Equity is
almost entirely made up of standards and principles, such as estoppel,
waiver, unclean hands, and so forth. From his perspective, this was a good
thing. In the end, Isaacs was a true believer in judge-made common law and
in the common law process. 7
4. Facilitation-Regulation
Contract law serves two functions-the facilitation of private ordering
and the regulation of the abuses of private ordering. The long-standing
debates (freedom-fairness, formalism-realism, textualism-contextualism,
standards-rules) are a result of contract theories that favor one or the other of
contract law's functions. It is imperative to keep in mind that both functions
are present in all eras of contract law development. An example, as
previously noted, is the characterization of the late-nineteenth century as an
era of pure freedom of contract, legal formalism, and laissez-faire
economics. In fact, private transactions were heavily regulated and
government intervention in the marketplace was widespread.258
Different eras, at least on the surface, call for less or more regulation of
private ordering. The facilitation function focuses on freedom of contract's
role in fostering private initiative; the regulatory function focuses on the need
to provide status-based restrictions to prevent the abuse of freedom of
contract. This is almost always the case following financial and economic
crises. But, this variation in degrees of regulation is both external and internal
to contract law. Government regulation aims at correcting market failures.
Internally, contract law, through equitable principles and policing doctrines,
intercedes at the case level to correct abuse-at least when found in
categories of similarly-situated cases or fact patterns.
The pseudo-duel between pro-freedom and pro-regulation advocates is
replicated in legal scholarship, such as the shifting questions of law (clear
meaning) to questions of fact (ambiguity) in contract interpretation, as
255. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity's Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth
Century's Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265 (1999) (asserting that
equitable values still play an important role in modem contract law); see also ROSCOE POUND,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (2d ed. 1959). Pound states: "The bigness of things in the
economy today, which precludes the equality of the parties that the regime of free contract supposed and
throws upon the service state to ensure the fulfillment of reasonable expectations which are increasingly
beyond reach of the ordinary [person]." ld at 163. And, Grant Gilmore asserts that: "Judges want to
decide the cases which come before them sensibly, wisely, even justly. Sense, wisdom, and justice are
community values, which change as the community changes. GILMORE, AGES, supra note 5, at 17.
256. Nathan Isaacs, The Limits of Judicial Discretion, 32 YALE L.J. 339, 345 (1923).
257. Another scholar summarized the overall philosophy of legal development that Isaacs saw in
Jewish law: "[Judaism] contains a body of ethical teaching that reckons realistically with the limitations
of human nature without losing faith in its potential." GORDIS, DYNAMICS OF JUDAISM, supra note 159,
at 6.
258. NOVAK, supra note 218.
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discussed in the previous section. The pseudo-debate references the fact that
contract law-whether in a perceived formalistic or realistic phase-is
always a blend of its two functions. 9 Contract law scholarship, from the
doctrinal level, to the heights of theoretical modeling for which American
academe is infamous, is as cyclical in nature as the law itself. Current
contract scholarship is built upon the works of Lord Mansfield, Fredrick
Pollock, Samuel Williston, Karl Llewellyn, Benjamin Cardozo, E. Allan
Farnsworth, Richard Posner, Ian Macneil, Patrick Atiyah, among many
others. At times, however, especially at the level of high theory and
abstraction, legal scholarship has become more like a spinning top on the
heads of these giants. Recent comments by justices of the United States
Supreme Court have been critical of the modem law reviews' penchant for
high theory.26 °
An example of this exercise in high theory, evidenced by the cyclical
nature of academic debates, is the academic banter between formalists
(classical formalism), anti-formalists (realism), and more recently, the anti-
anti-formalists (neo-formalism). Legal formalism characterized the era of the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.2 6' It was attacked by the Legal
Realists of the 1920s and 1930s, who correctly and successfully argued that
other considerations, such as public policy, equity, and bias, played important
roles in judicial decisions other than the mere formalistic application of rules.
In contract law this turn in legal reasoning was evidenced in the shift from
formalistic to contextual approaches to contract interpretation. This realism
about the law has held sway ever since, and remains the mainstream view,
but the advent of the law and economics movement saw some scholars
support a return to formalism in the interpretation of contracts. This body of
work, known as neo-formalism or anti-anti-formalism, 2 6 2 shows the cyclical
nature of legal scholarship, which may or may not track changes in law or
society. The problem is that much of such scholarship is mere academic
gamesmanship and elitism, lacking anything new or any relevancy to legal
practice.
259. Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 235 (1993). Patterson notes that a court simply looks at contextual evidence and weaves
a conclusion of implied intent by examining the essence of the contract within the context of the
contracting. Id. at 243.
260. Justice Breyer has commented: "there is evidence that law review articles have left terra firma
to soar into outer space." Stephen G. Breyer, Response of Justice Stephen G. Breyer, 64 N.Y.U. ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 33, 33 (2008); John Roberts C.J., A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts, Annual Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals Conference, C-SPAN (June 25, 2011), https://www.c-span.org/video/?300203-
1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts; Adam Liptak, Keep the Briefs Brief Literary Justices Advise, N.Y.
TIMES (May 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21 /us/politics/2 I court.html (Chief Justice
Roberts states that "[w]hat the academy is doing, as far as I can tell is largely of no use or interest to
people who actually practice law.")
261. C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871); see also
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983).
262. See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 104, at 511, 539; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 60 and
accompanying text. Cf Dennis Patterson, The Metaphysics of Legal Formalism, 77 IowA L. REV. 741
(1992) (critiquing Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE
L.J. 949 (1988), and formalism's "internal perspective of law.").
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In this story of legal scholarship, instead of legal formalism being a
target of critique, realism and contextualism are the initial straw men. The
neo-formalists seek to discredit the Llewellynian-Mansfieldian 263 view that
a contract between merchants includes the background of business custom,
trade usage, and prior dealings. This attack is premised on the assumption
that businesspersons neither need nor want their contracts to be interpreted
using contextual evidence to determine the true meaning of their contracts.
As discussed previously, such an argument has no anchor in real world
contract disputes and to expect courts to ignore all extrinsic or contractual
evidence no matter how probative is fantastical!
D. PRINCIPLES-BASED EVOLUTION
Isaacs observed that John Dewey's definition of logic included "any of
the methods actually used to reach conclusions, whether they have been
careless or extremely careful, whether they involve demonstration or only
approximation of the truth sought. ' ' 2' The task for Isaacs was to reconcile
the universality of natural law principles and the incoherency of legal
conceptualism-the application of general principles to rapidly changing
content. Despite the seeming incoherency of melding natural law principles
with changing legal rules, Isaacs believed that a successful mediation
between the conflicting elements of general principles and changing content
was possible. Isaacs looked to the pragmatic philosophy of Dewey to support
the compatibility of fixed principles and changing rules. 265 Put simply,
different tasks require different types of logic. Depending on the immediate
task, one kind of logic may depend heavily on intuition, while others may
require more mathematical rigor.266 For Isaacs, there was no one ideal form
of logic.267 He believed that this type of pragmatic, flexible reasoning had
deep roots in the common law.
2 68
263. Both Lord Mansfield and Karl Llewellyn believed that commercial law was merchant-created
law that was recognized in law. In this way law is constantly updated to respond to real world
developments. This grassroots view of the law requires the flow of contextual evidence into the
courtroom. Lord Mansfield made a great effort to bring English merchant law up to the same standards
as that of other European nations, defining his position by saying that "the daily negotiations and property
of merchants ought not to depend on subtleties and niceties, but upon rules easily learned and easily
retained because they are dictates of common sense drawn from the truth of the case." EDMUND HEWARD,
LORD MANSFIELD: A BIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM MURRAY IST EARL OF MANSFIELD 1705 1793, at 101
(1979). Karl Llewellyn incorporated the contextual approach of interpretation into the U.C.C. See U.C.C
§§ 1-201 (good faith obligation), 1-205 (course of dealing and usage of trade), 2-202 (final written
expression: parol or extrinsic evidence), and 2-208 (course of performance or practical construction).
264. Nathan lsaacs, How Lawyers Think, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 556 (1923) [hereinafter tsaacs,
How Lawyers Think]; see also Isaacs, Influence of Judaism, supra note 84, at 385.
265. See John Dewey, Logical Method andLaw, 10 CORNELL L. REV. 17 (1924); see JULIUS STONE,
TRE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 410 n. 101 (1947).
266. Nathan lsaacs, Address to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences: Political, Legal, and
Economic Logics-and Logic (Jan. 13, 1937) (on file with Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard
Business School, Box 3, File: Speeches, 1937).
267. Isaacs, How Lawyers Think, supra notes 264, at 556.
268. Id. at 557.
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The danger of a simplistic view of legal development is that it never
provides the nuances of real understanding. The opinion that law, or at least
the common law, is purely a progressive movement becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The prism of progressive evolution biases the interpreter toward a
revisionist view of history in order to confirm progressive legal evolution.269
At the same time, Isaacs believed that common law development should not
be characterized by chaotic shifts. Thus, it is important to examine the
relationship between legal change and guiding principles. One measure of
cycle theory is demonstrated by the differences and commonalities found in
the various common law systems. At a given time the differences in the
systems may be explained as a product of being at different places in the
cycle.27 ° Cycle theory, as progressive evolution, is possible, under Isaacs's
scheme, by the discovery of universal principles upon which the cycles are
guided. 71 These principles, some in tension with each other, guide the
constant change in the content of the law: "Through a careful combination
of fidelity to the past and, when necessary, innovation and creativity, legal
authorities have responded to these challenges by applying settled and
known legal principles to resolve the questions accompanying new and
unanticipated circumstances." '272 Thus, principles of historical dimensions
provide the means to understand and predict legal change. 7 3
Principles-based evolution is found in the analogical reasoning
ensconced in the common law. It is the recognition of the belief in underlying
principles that cut across areas of law, and more fundamentally across
disparate areas of law. The key to the dynamic nature of law is that principles
can be found by deductive and inductive reasoning. On the conceptual side,
underlying principles are used as a guide in applying existing law to novel
cases. On the factual side, the recognition of novel cases leads to the
categorization of those cases as a specific "type" in which new rules or
exceptions can be based. These needed new rules or exceptions are best
created by the use of underlying principles. In Dworkinian terms, the new
rules or exceptions need to fit within the overall framework of the given body
of law. 27
4
269. See Nathan lsaacs, The Common Law of the Bible: Elements from Much Earlier Periods of
Legal Development Which Underlie and Are Unconsciously Presupposed in Written Code, 7 A.B.A. J.
117 (1921) (claiming that a knowledge of the development ofunwritten law takes the sting out of turn of
the twentieth century Higher Biblical Criticism).
270. For an example of analyzing the comparative efficiency of rules found in the common law
versus the civil legal systems, see Larry A. DiMatteo & Daniel T. Ostas, Comparative Efficiency in
International Sales Law, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 371 (2011).
271. Samuel Flaks summarizes Isaacs's view of the role of universal principles in legal evolution:
"lsaacs's cyclical theory of legal development posits that law is constantly changing in order to bridge
the ideals ofjustice and the shifting realities of society." Flaks, Law, Religion, and Pluralism, supra note
1, at 324.
272. Levine, Self-Incrimination, supra note 156, at 262-63.
273. Nathan Isaacs, Preface [of a planned book collection of his articles C.E. 1923], at 1-4 (NI
Articles, BLHC, HBS, supra note 9, Box 4, File: "Chapters in books possibly published, undated").
274. Dworkin described hard cases as follows: "Some cases, moreover, raise issues so novel that
they cannot be decided even by stretching or reinterpreting existing rules. So judges must sometimes
make new law, either covertly or explicitly." Dworkin, supra note 94, at 1058. Under Dworkin's view of
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Under Isaacs's theory of legal development, the court's duty is to
uncover underlying historical principles to guide them in rendering decisions
in hard or novel cases. Isaacs's student notes (from Dean Pound's class)
reveal that he was attracted to the work of German Philosopher Rudolph
Stammler and his concept of"a natural law with a variable content." '275 While
Isaacs believed that law constantly changed to better serve the needs of
society, he also accepted as a tenet of his legal faith that there is such a thing
as justice as an ideal-an unchanging goal that is independent of the
changing historical context, and that there are different ways of
approximating that goal in different historical contexts.27 6
Isaacs sought to use cycle theory to uncover underlying principles that
provide the means to make changes in the law. 27 7 The tension between
competing principles would have to be properly balanced in order for legal
reform to make law functional and just. In contract law, the tension between
the principles of private economy and fairness, or as the balancing contract
law's facilitative and regulatory functions, constantly work to effect change
in the law. A blend of these seemingly intractable adversaries is found in all
eras of the law. Isaacs's cycle theory recognizes that changes in law are
simply movements towards one of the competing core principles. In contract
law, changes in society lead to greater protections of weaker contracting
parties or towards free contracting.
E. PROGRESSIVE-CYCLICAL EVOLUTION
Cycle theory should not be construed as a series of advancements and
regressions in the development of the law. Dynamism in the law is needed to
respond to societal changes and is inherently progressive in nature, but it is
not a linear progression as symbolized by Maine's famous adage. Instead, it
is better described, as a cyclical progression based upon the premise that
unregulated freedom of contract is its own worst enemy. The 2008 world
financial crisis is a testament to freedom of contract's abuses in the creation
of new financial instruments that masked underlying risks. Inevitably, such
law as interpretation the perfect judge in approaching hard cases finds the right answer by applying
principles that results in the creation of a rule that is the best fit to the entire body of law:
Hercules must discover principles that fit, not only the particular precedent to which some
litigant directs his attention, but all otherjudicial decisions within his general jurisdiction and,
indeed, statutes as well, so far as these must be seen to be generated by principle rather than
policy. He does not satisfy his duty to show that his decision is consistent with established
principles, and therefore fair, if the principles he cites as established are themselves
inconsistent with other decisions that his court also proposes to uphold.
Id. at 1094.
275. Cf CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 249 (1930) (quoting
RUDOLF STAMMLER, THEORIE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 124 (1911); RUDOLF STAMMLER, DIE LEHRE
VON DEM RICHTIGEN RECHTE 93, 196 (1902)).
276. Cf MOSCOVITZ, supra note 151, at 339-42 ("the impact of explicit legal principles seems
rather limited" in Talmudic reasoning).
277. Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's
"Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 120 (2000) (emphasis added) (citing Isaacs, The
Standardizing of Contracts, supra note 32, at 40-41).
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abuse results in greater regulation of the free market. This last crisis resulted
in the creation of a number of status-based concepts from "too-big-to-fail"
bailouts of financial companies to the establishment in the United States of
a new consumer protection agency 78 to provide greater protections in
consumer lending, such as fuller disclosures of the nature of financial
instruments, the meaning of ratings, and prohibitions against predatory
lending.
The cyclical nature of contract is seen at the grassroots of deal making.
The engines that drive the free market include innovation and creativity.
Entrepreneurs often gravitate away from heavily regulated transaction types
through the creation of new transaction types. A classic example is the
evolution of the franchise contract. This new form of doing business allowed
for the rapid expansion of an entity through the creation of independently
owned franchise operations. The franchise paradigm was a creature of
business and legal innovation, and has become a popular form of doing
business. The innovation of franchising was made possible by freedom of
contract. Oliver Wendell Holmes's view of legal development was that it
evolved as a practical response to societal change: "Holmes' thesis-that
societies are constantly reinterpreting legal forms to serve new purposes-
has been labelled 'evolutionary pragmatism."'2 79 For Holmes, law is
inherently a dynamic phenomenon that is a mixture of old and new, and the
new is often a reinvention of old ideas applied to new settings. This idea of
pragmatic evolution is best captured in the aphorism that: "[T]he law is
always approaching, and never reaching, consistency."28 The interesting
question is whether pragmatic evolution is the same as progressive evolution.
It is important that law changes to meet the needs and changes of society,
but such change may only be progressive on the surface. At a deeper level
this may not be so. Societies and governments often make errors, such as
instituting forms of discrimination. In such cases, society and law would be
regressive from the perspective of what is good and right. Surprisingly,
Maine also never stated that legal evolution was always a normatively
positive progression. It is important to note that Maine's status-to-contract
progression adage was qualified by the word "hitherto." Thus until the mid-
nineteenth century, progress had been characterized by a movement from
kinship (status) relationships to individual freedom to contract. This implies
that the future does not preclude the evolution of other status-based
protections or relationships.
Initially, franchise contracts were lightly regulated-both internally by
contract law and externally by government regulation. But, the search for
additional profits was inevitable given the moral hazard problems that most
franchise agreements present. In the early stages of a franchise, the interests
278. See CONSUMER PROTECTION FINANCIAL BUREAU, http://www.consumer finance.gov (last
visited Apr. 14, 2018).
279. E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38, 51-
52 (1985) (citing P. WIENER, EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM 172 (1949)).
280. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 32 (M. Howe ed., 1963). Holmes further
states that the law "is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old ones
from history at the other .... It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow." Id.
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of the franchisor and the franchisee are aligned. Their self-interests are one
in the same-the launch of a profitable franchise operation. However, the
more profitable the franchise, the greater possibility that one of the parties
will try to capture more profits or value. The franchisee may feel they no
longer need the franchisor and see franchise costs and fees as a result of
overreaching by the franchisor. The franchisee may take steps to avoid full
payment of fees or elect to terminate the franchise agreement and go it alone.
The more likely scenario is that of franchisor opportunism. This could
include franchise encroachment (locating company operations in proximity
to the franchised operation) and franchise termination (franchisor takes over
franchised operation); often within the terms of its franchise agreement, such
as termination with cause or by way of non-renewal.28 The abusive exercise
of freedom of contract by franchisors resulted in the law converting the
relationship to a partially status-based one. Courts have used the doctrine of
unconscionability to void overly one-sided franchise terms. More
importantly, many states passed anti-termination statutes to protect
franchisees from opportunistic terminations.
As noted with the evolution of franchising and its regulation, freedom of
contract is the force behind change and subsequently the regulation of the
product of that change. If the amount of regulation, internally (contract law)
or externally (government regulation), becomes pervasive, then
entrepreneurs will seek ways around such laws by the use or creation of
alternative transaction types. For example, the franchisor may shift to a
limited liability company business model for each of its franchised locations.
The freedom of contract rationale is the core concept underlying limited
liability company law in the United States. The former franchisor could draft
an operating agreement in which it retains all powers as a member-manager.
In the future, the abuse of such powers is likely to persuade courts to protect
the minority investor (member) by viewing the member-manager and
member relationship as status-based. This process continues ad infinitum
with freedom of contract providing the means for the creation of novel types
of relationships and the law infusing them with status-based qualities.
82
From the internal perspective of case law development, as noted earlier,
Isaacs, and subsequently Llewellyn, saw the status-based elements of the law
as a grassroots creation in which community norms and practices become
incorporated into the status-based relationship and are subsequently
recognized in law.283
281. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191 (2010) (arguing
franchise value is dependent on the franchisee right to defend its territory from the franchisor or other
franchisees).
282. Morris Cohen would adopt this insight of the quasi-status, quasi-contract track of legal
development in his often-cited The Basis of Contract. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV.
L. REV. 553, 558, 560-64, 587 (1933).
283. Llewellyn advocated that commercial law was found in the background of business custom
and commercial practice. In addition, law created new rules based upon "situation sense" in which cases
are organized into transaction types. Through the grouping of similar "fact-situations" (patterns) the
courts uncover the "immanent law" found in real world practice: "Only as a judge or court knows the
facts of life.., can they lift the burden [that] lays upon them: to uncover and to implement the immanent
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As discussed in previous sections, progressiveness of law's evolution is
supported by the common sense thesis that law is dynamic and changes to
meet the needs of changing societal conditions. 84 The cyclical nature
recognizes that there are relatively stable dichotomies whose opposing poles
fluctuate over time. What is also clear is that even when given ends of the
poles become dominant in a given era of legal development, its dominance
is never absolute. Every era possesses both sides of the dichotomies.
The complexity of contract law also makes any monist theory of legal
reasoning incomplete.28 5 The whole body of contract can only be explained
by a matrix of values; these values often are addressed by different modes of
legal reasoning. 86 The lens of history allows for the acceptance of most
theories of contract law as viable and helpful as part of a composite
understanding of contract as a whole. Only as a composite of different
theories or principles can contract law be fully explained.2 87 However,
individual areas or rules of contract reflect different "blends" of the
competing values. For example, the lack of precontractual liability for bad
faith negotiations in the common law was based upon the belief that parties
should not be constrained in their negotiation of contracts. But, over time,
American common law developed the doctrine of promissory estoppel that
can be used to prevent abuse in the pre-contract process in order to prevent
injustice.28 8
Cycle theory can be reduced to the idea that there is a remixing of
contract law's competing values from time to time. For contract law, the
status-contract dichotomy possesses descriptive power in explaining the
different eras of contracts, the sway of the underlying poles of contact law-
freedom versus regulation-and the persistence of formalistic and contextual
modes of interpretation. The dichotomy is a powerful tool to analyze the
surface crust of contract law-its principles, standards, and rules. However,
law." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 127 (1960) (emphasis
omitted).
284. Supra Part V.A.; LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 135 ("society in flux").
285. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW (1997) (asserting that no one theory can explain the
complexity of contract law, but that different theories possess explanatory power in understanding parts
of contract law).
286. Professor Glenn describes proponents of monist theories as: "those which presuppose a single,
ultimate value in the world against which all must be measured." Glenn, Incommensurable?, supra note
150, at 137.
287. For the idea of a normative composite approach, see DiMatteo, Norms of Contract, supra note
203; LARRY A. DIMATrEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS: STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES (2000).
288. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). It is interesting to note that in
English common law that promissory estoppel can only be used defensively (such as preserving
contractual obligations for lack of consideration or insufficient agreement). It is not the basis for a cause
of action to recover reliance damages, as is the case in American common law. The rise of promissory
estoppel was captured in what has been referred to as the Williston-Corbin debate. Samuel Williston and
Arthur Corbin were the two professors entrusted to manage the drafting of the FIRST RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACT, which was published in 1932. Williston, a classical contract scholar, championed the bargain
theory of contract as represented in Section 75 of the Restatement, while Corbin pushed the idea that
contractual liability can be based on either promise or reliance. Corbin championed the insertion of
Section 90 (detrimental reliance) into the Restatement. See Daniel J. Klau, What Price Certainty? Corbin,
Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts, 70 B.U.L. REV. 511 (1990).
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the scholar needs to dig below the crust to better understand the tensions that
underlie society and contract law. Cycle theory is a useful descriptive tool in
understanding those tensions and the evolution of contract law.
In the end, however, despite the explanatory power of cycle theory and
the status versus contract-based relationships model, any description or
theory of contract cannot escape the curse of reductionism. H. Patrick Glenn
states that "the nature of the western, philosophical enquiry relating to
incommensurability, which is that of seeking incommensurable values
'within a conceptual scheme, way of life, or culture.' There would thus be
incommensurabilities within western life, but they would all nest within the
range of permissible choices which western life offers to us." '289 The "range
of permissible choices" is determined by the normative composite that lies
behind contract law, including the values of freedom, private autonomy,
justice, and fairness. Since these values are often in tension, the law
continues to cycle between the different poles of the discussed dichotomies
in response to real world developments, but always within a stable
framework of a "permissible" mix of norms and values.
VI. CONCLUSION
The constant need to update law is captured nicely in Nathan Isaacs's
cycle theory. The anachronistic nature of an area of law is confronted in a
number of ways. The two most obvious include the use of judicial discretion
or the enactment or revision by statute. The recognition by legislatures of
law's obsolescence motivates it to update the law. Once enacted, the courts
strive to set initial precedents that accurately represent the meaning of the
statutory text. However, over time novel cases challenge the ability of a court
to apply statutory text to resolve such cases. Ultimately, the ill fit of rule to
case is resolved by the creation of a rule adjustment, either through the
creation of an exception or through the creation of a judicial fiction.29° The
recognition of an application of appropriate core principles can be used to
guide the rule adjustment. At some point, however, basic principles can no
longer be plausibly stretched, resulting in anachronistic rules becoming so
attenuated that the divergence between text and application becomes
irreparable. At this point of obsolescence, either courts will have to
dramatically disregard legal precedent or the legislature will have to
intervene to restate or reform what has become a chaotic jurisprudence of
fictions and exceptions. The cycle then begins anew.
Isaacs's paradigm calls on judges to continuously strive to uncover
underlying objective principles and to understand their historical evolution.
He sought to blend an evolving, cyclical, and organic theory of legal
development with the pragmatism needed to make rules work. To do this, the
contingent nature of law must be contained within a framework of moral,
political, and cultural values. Isaacs's analysis of contract law and other areas
289. Glenn, Incommensurable?, supra note 150, at 138 (quoting RUTH CHANG,
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACTICAL REASON 2 (R. Chang ed., 1997)).
290. See Dworkin, supra note 94.
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of law reflected both a critical and positive theory of the legal order. This
fusion of an organic natural law with the inherent indeterminacy of legal
conceptualism moves beyond rules29 1 to a principle-based contextualism.
Isaacs's cycle theory contests Henry Sumner Maine Thesis' linear
progression paradigm that societies move from status to contract-based
private ordering; it better explains legal evolution and the dynamic nature of
law. From a law and society perspective the dynamism of law can be
explained as a reaction to developments in society. The legal cycle begins
with grassroots changes in practice and subsequently in the law. Cycle
theory, if correct, has major implications on how we view legal development.
Plausible implications include: (1) the development of law is best undertaken
through a contextual methodology of interpretation. (2) Although there is a
powerful argument for the contingent nature of law, that contingency does
and must work within a framework of moral, political, and cultural values.
(3) Recognition of the dynamic and cyclical nature of law allows for a
negative critique along with a positive theory of development. This is largely
done by grounding rules and adjustment in historically evolved principles.
Thus, "hard cases" are not decided by pure deduction, but by reference to
underlying reason and equities. Cycle theory seeks to reconcile the
universality of principles with the indeterminacy of legal conceptualism.
291. Beyond Rules, supra note 76.
